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Abstract
This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit should overrule McDougald. Part I discusses the
purpose, process, and problems of the crime generally known as money laundering. Part I also
discusses national efforts against money laundering, and in particular, the United States’ efforts
through Section 1956 of the Money Laundering Control Act. Part I concludes by discussing the
Salinas-Citibank Affair and the probable prosecution of Citibank for money laundering violations.
Part II reviews the Sixth Circuit’s line of cases leading up to and including the McDougald decision. Part II also contrasts McDougald by reviewing the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits in United States v. Carr and United States v. Campbell,
respectfully, both of which addressed the same issue as McDougald but differed in their interpretations of Section 1956. Part III argues that the Sixth Circuit should overrule its decision in
McDougald. The Court’s holding is in direct conflict with the plain meaning of the statute as
well as the statute’s legislative intent. The Court’s holding is also in conflict with the international
community’s efforts against money laundering. Finally, overruling McDougald will prevent misapplication of Section 1956 in future cases, such as the case that will most likely be born out of
the Salinas-Citibank Affair.

UNITED STATES v. McDOUGALD: THE ANATHEMA TO 18
U.S.C. § 1956 AND NATIONAL EFFORTS AGAINST
MONEY LAUNDERING
Mathew PauloseJr.*
INTRODUCTION
On June 3, 1996, the United States Justice Department
('Justice Department") opened an investigation into what has
become known as the most sweeping investigation of its kind.1
The investigation involves Citibank North America ("Citibank")
and an inquiry into whether it knowingly accepted, deposited,
and disseminated more than US$100 million in allegedly illegitimate income belonging to Raul Salinas de Gortari, the brother
of former Mexican president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari ("SalinasCitibank Affair"). 2 If the inquiry proves true, the Justice Department will charge Citibank for money laundering, in violation of
section 1956(a) (2) (B) (i) ("Section 1956") of the Money Laundering Control Act.'
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University. This Comment is dedicated to my

family for their unconditional support and encouragement.
1. Anthony DePalma & Peter Truell, A Mexican Mover and Shaker Got the Red Carpet
at Citibank, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1996, at Al; see Salinas Case has Ramificationsfor Citicorp's
Legal Obligations,SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 5, 1996, at 3D (stating that Citibank probe is "most
sweeping investigation of its kind).
2. Laurie Hays, Citibank Cop was Kept Off SalinasProbe, WALL ST.J.,June 11, 1996, at
A3; DePalma & Truell, supra note 1, at Al. At the time of the investigation, Citibank
was the second largest bank in the United States. Salinas Case has Ramificationsfor Citicorp's Legal Obligations, supra note 1, at 3D. Citibank currently moves US$98 trillion a
year through 97 countries. Hays, supra, at A3.
Carlos Salinas de Gortari was Mexico's president from 1988 to 1994. Sergio
Sarmiento, The Americas: A Witch's Tale of Murder Transfixes Mexican Politics, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 25, 1996, at A15. The United States celebrated him as a "financially savvy, honest,
Harvard-educated 'reformer' who was opening up Mexico to foreign investment and
foreign trade." 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, June 23, 1996). His brother, Raul
Salinas, in contrast, was a Mexican civil servant earning less than US$200,000 a year.
Anthony Hilton, Citibank Laundering Talk Just Does Not Wash, EVENING STANDARD, June 7,
1996, at 1.
3. U.S. Laundering Law Applies in Salinas Case, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Jan. 1,
1996, at 1; see Laurie Hays & Michael Allen, U.S. Probeof Citibank and Raul SalinasHinges
on the Role of Banks in Policing,WALL ST. J., June 6, 1996, at A4 (discussingJustice Department's investigation into Citibank).
Money laundering is the process by which a person or institution conceals the
existence, source or application of illegal income, and then disguises that income to
make it appear legitimate. INTERIM REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME,
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Section 1956, 4 prohibits a person or institution from transporting, internationally, illegitimate income knowing the income represents proceeds from some form of unlawful activity,
and knowing the transportation was designed to disguise some
aspect of the proceeds, such as its source.' The section possesses
two mens rea requirements,6 both of which are knowledge. 7 In
AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984) [hereinafter INTERIM REThe major U.S. money laundering statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 & 1957. Howard W. Goldstein, Money-Laundering Regulations, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1996, at 5. Section
1956 is considered the principal money laundering statute. 'Specified Unlawful Activities'
Vital in Laundering Cases, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, June 1, 1995. Section 1957 carries
less punishment and is less used by federal prosecutors. Goldstein, supra, at 5. Section
1957 prohibits a person from knowingly engaging in a banking transaction with a financial institution involving illegal property of a value greater than US$10,000. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957 (1997); see John K. Villa, Banking Crimes: Fraud, Money Laundering and Embezzlement, 935 PLI/CoRP 445 (1996) (analyzing section 1957).
Both statutes were introduced in the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, Title 1, subtitle H; see Jason
Schuck and Matthew E. Unterlack, Money Laundering, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 881 (Spring
1996) (providing overview of Money Laundering Control Act); G. Richard Strafer,
Money Laundering: The Crime of the 90's, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 149, 150-161 (1989) (providing historical overview); see also Goldstein supra, at 5 (reviewing new set of regulations governing money laundering); Leslie Alan Horvitz, Creativity Keeps CriminalsAwash
in Laundered Money, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, June 10, 1996, at 38 (providing background on
current status of money laundering). US$300 billion is 'cleaned' annually in the
United States and about US$500 billion is 'cleaned' world-wide. Id.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (B) (i) (1997). The statute reads:
(a) (2) [w]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the
United States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place in
the United States from or through a place outside the United States
(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in part
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.., shall be
sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both.
Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Section 1956, a criminal statute, consists of elements. Id. Elements are
those constituent parts of a crime which prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt to sustain a conviction. Com. v. Burke, 457 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Mass. 1990);
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 520 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK'S]. Constituent parts
may be categorized as actus reus, causation, and mens rea. Id. Mens rea is defined as
the element regarding the requisite guilty mind or criminal intent of the accused. Id. at
985.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
PORT].
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the context of the Salinas-Citibank Affair, a charge of Section
1956 will require the Justice Department to prove that Citibank
transported Raul Salinas's money knowing the money represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and knowing that the transportation was designed to disguise some aspect
of the money, such as the money's source. 8
Notwithstanding the difficulty of proving two mental states, 9
the Justice Department will encounter an additional issue. In
1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
("Sixth Circuit") in united States v. McDougald1 ° used language
interpreting Section 1956's first mens rea requirement as requiring knowledge of a specific unlawful activity, rather than some form
of unlawful activity.1" The case dealt with the prosecution of
Bobby McDougald, a retired army sergeant, who had purchased
a new car for a convicted drug dealer using US$10,000 of the
drug dealer's money.1 2 The Justice Department successfully convicted McDougald under Section 1956, but was reversed on appeal.1 3 The Sixth Circuit held that the Justice Department had
failed to prove McDougald knew the US$10,000 represented
proceeds of a specific unlawful activity, which in the case the
Court emphasized was drug trafficking. 4
The McDougald holding is in direct conflict with the plain
meaning of the statute and the statute's legislative history.15 And
although the Sixth Circuit has retreated to a certain extent from
its decision, 6 it has yet to overrule McDougald. This Comment
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). "Knowledge" is defined as the acquaintance with
fact or truth. People v. Henry, 72 P.2d 915, 921 (Cal. App. 1990); BLACK'S, supra note 6,
at 872. "When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its
existence." Id.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (B) (i); see U.S. Laundering Law Applies in Salinas Case,
supra note 3 (applying § 1956's mens rea requirements to Salinas Citibank Affair).
9. See Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering ControlAct of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 Irr'L LAw. 69, 71 (1988) (indicating that
focus in most money laundering cases is on proving mens rea requirements).
10. 990 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1993).
11. Id.
12. Id.at 260-61.
13. Id.
14. Id.at 262-63.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1956; seeUnited States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1204 (3d. Cir. 1994)
(holding that requisite mens rea element is satisfied if it is established that defendant
knew he was carrying funds representing proceeds of some form of unlawful activity).
16. See United States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing
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argues that the Sixth Circuit should overrule McDougald. Part I
discusses the purpose, process, and problems of the crime generally known as money laundering. Part I also discusses national
efforts against money laundering, and in particular, the United
States's efforts through Section 1956 of the Money Laundering
Control Act. Part I concludes by discussing the Salinas-Citibank
Affair and the probable prosecution of Citibank for money laundering violations.
Part II reviews the Sixth Circuit's line of cases leading up to
and including the McDougald decision. Part II also contrasts McDougald by reviewing the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits in United States v.
Car' 7 and United States v. Campbell,"8 respectfully, both of which
addressed the same issue as McDougald but differed in their interpretations of section 1956.
Part III argues that the Sixth Circuit should overrule its decision in McDougald. The Court's holding is in direct conflict
with the plain meaning of the statute as well as the statute's legislative intent. The Court's holding is also in conflict with the international community's efforts against money laundering.
Finally, overruling McDougald will prevent misapplication of section 1956 in future cases, such as the case that will most likely be
born out of the Salinas-Citibank Affair.
I. BACKGROUND
Money laundering is an international problem demanding
an international response. 9 Traditionally, national efforts in the
international field have focused on combating money laundering solely in connection with drug trafficking. z Recently international efforts have diverged from the traditional view and have
now focused on combating money laundering in connection
with all major crimes.2 1 The United States led the new approach
McDougald on grounds that it only applied "where evidence of defendant's knowledge
...was as consistent with innocence as with guilt.").
17. 25 F.3d 1194 (1994).
18. 977 F.2d 854 (1992).
19. Richard Parlour, Preface to BUTrERWORTHS INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO MONEY
LAUNDERING at vii (Richard Parlour ed., 1995) [hereinafter GUIDE TO MONEY LAUNDERING].
20. Hans G. Nilsson, Preface to MONEY LAUNDERING AND BANKING SECRECY at ix (Pa-

olo Bernasconi ed., 1996).
21. Id. at x.
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with Section 1956, considered one of the most powerful antimoney laundering statutes in the world.2 2 With the Department
of Justice's investigation into Citibank, section 1956 will once
again be under scrutiny. 3
A. Money Laundering
Money laundering is the process by which one conceals the
existence, source, or use of illegitimate income, 24 and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate.25 The purpose
It has become clear that organized crime needs to be fought on all fronts.
The criminalization of and fight against the proceeds derived from all kinds of
offenses has become a necessity. The criminal should not be permitted to
profit from his crime, be it a drugs trafficker, terrorist, illegal arms trader or a
trafficker of children.
Id.
22. Amy G. Rudnick, United States, in GUIDE TO MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 19,

at 236.
23. See Hays & Allen, supra note 3, at A4 (discussing section 1956 and its imminent
role in Salinas-Citibank Affair).
24. See BLACK'S, supra note 6, at 747 (defining "illegitimate" as "[t]hat which is
contrary to law."). "Illegitimate income" is used here and throughout the Comment to
define income derived from transactions contrary to law, such as racketeering, bribery,
and narcotics trafficking. INGO WALTER, SECRET MONEY 407 (1985); see Annual Meeting
of the American Corporation Counsel Assoc., Money Laundering: What it is and How to
Counter it, 14 ACCA DOCKET 28, 29 (1996) [hereinafter Money Laundering] (using "criminal proceeds" in place of "illegitimate income"); BLACK'S, supra note 6, at 884 (defining
"laundering" as "[lerm used to describe investment or other transfer of money flowing
from racketeering, drug transactions, and other illegal sources .... ").
25. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. The term "money laundering" has an uncertain origin. See CHARLES A. INTRIAGO, INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING 1

(1991) (discussing origins .of term). Although recently considered commonplace, the
term predates to biblical times. See id. (quoting Acts 5, Verses I through 11 of the
Bible).
Today, money laundering has been defined in a number of ways. See, e.g., HERBERT
E. ALEXANDER & GERALD E. *CAIDEN, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIME
39 (1985) ("[T]he process of converting quantities of cash - generally currency that
has been tainted in some way - to a form that can be used more conveniently in
commerce and usually conceals the origin of converted funds."); Kirk W. Munroe, Surviving the Solution: The ExtraterritorialReach of the United States, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 505,
508 (1996) ("[T]he cleansing of money earned from an illegal business to appear to be
a product of a lawful business."); Nicholas Clark, The Impact of Recent Money Laundering
Legislation on FinancialIntermediaries, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 467, 469 (1996) (" [T] he process
by which the proceeds of crime or fraud are made to appear as if they have emanated
from a legitimate source."); Scott E. Mortman, Note, Putting Starch in European Efforts to

Combat Money Laundering, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. S429, S429 (1992)("[T]he process of
using legitimate institutions to conceal the source of illegitimate gains."). As one author states, the "goal of every criminal enterprise is to 'get away clean.' Money laundering hides the trail of illegal profits and thus aids the 'getaway."' Mathew B. Comstock,
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of money laundering is to free the illegitimate income's use in
the legitimate economy. 26 Money laundering is estimated to le27
gitimatize US$500 billion each year.
1. The Purpose of Money Laundering
Money laundering is an indispensable element to most
criminal operations.2 8 By disguising the existence, source, and
use of criminally derived income, money laundering liberates
the income for use in the legitimate economy.29 Liberated income, in turn, assists the criminal operations to continue their
particular operation or fund new operations.3 0 Absent the
money laundering process, criminal operations could function
31
only at a fraction of current levels.
GATT and GATS: A PublicMorals Attack on Money Laundering, 15 NW.J. INT'L L. Bus. 139,

140-41 (1994) (citations omitted).
26. Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on FinancialInstitutions, 19 N.C.J. INT'L LAw & CoM. REG. 437, 437-38 (1994).

27. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BuREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAw ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, Financial Crime and Money Laundering, in INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
STRATEGY REPORT 19-20 (1995).
28. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3; Kaufman, supra note 25, at 794; Alford, supra
note 26, at 439; see Jimmy Gurule, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creatinga
New Federal Offense or Merely Affording FederalProsecutors an Alternative Means of Punishing
Specified Unlawful Activity?, 32 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 823, 823-26 (1995) (describing money
laundering as "lifeblood" to criminal operations); Comstock, supra note 25, at 144
(describing money laundering as "keystone" to criminal operations).
29. Alford, supra note 26, at 439; see Comstock, supra note 25, at 140 (stating that
"money laundering empowers crime."); Money Laundering, supra note 24, at 29 (stating

that once a criminal's income is disguised, "the criminal can enjoy the profits.").
30. John L. Evans, InternationalMoney Laundering: Enforcement Challenges and Opportunities, 3 Sw.J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 195, 210 (1996); see Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money
Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 164-65
(1995) (stating money laundering "keeps organized and white-collar crime afloat" and
"funds terrorist organizations and buys their arms and supplies."); Anton Hauck, Combating Cross-Border Crime: Germany's Money LaunderingLegislation, 7-AUT INT'L L. PRACrICuM 88, 88-89 (1994) (stating money laundering is "used to expand the wealth of the
syndicate.").
31. Kaufman, supra note 25, at 794. Combating money laundering, therefore, has
become one of the primary methods used by law enforcement authorities to reduce
criminal operations. Clark, supra note 25, at 469.
Originally, these [authorities] fought organized crime by seeking to imprison
those at its heart. This was ineffective and thus asset forfeiture was viewed as
the key to combating such crime. If the criminal is prevented from enjoying
the fruits of his labor, then his motivation for committing that crime also disappears.
Id. There is, however, the possibility of a "vicious circle .. . : stringent legislation enabling asset forfeiture merely makes it necessary for the criminal to launder his money

MONEY LAUNDERING
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2. The Process of Money Laundering
The process of money laundering involves the placement of
criminally derived income into the field of commerce where the
income is exchanged into an asset that is free from criminal taint
although not necessarily free from the original taint of criminality.3 2 The process of money laundering is not precluded to any
single method, however.3 3 The process of money laundering entails an innumerable array of methods.3 4 The goal, however, is
more effectively... which, in turn, requires further anti-money laundering legislation."
Id. at 470.
32. ALEXANDER & CAIDEN, supra note 25, at 39; see Alford, supra note 26, at 439:
Money laundering essentially consists of three stages: (1) the placement of
money, (2) the layering of money, and (3) the integration of money. The
placement of money refers to the physical disposal of cash into a financial
institution. The layering of money refers to the transfer of money through
several accounts or institutions in order to separate the money from its original illegal source. The integration of money refers to the shifting of funds to a
legitimate business.
Id. at 439 (citations omitted); see Comstock, supra note 25, at 141-42 (detailing three
stages); see also Money Laundering, supra note 24, at 29 (providing example of three
stages):
A criminal who has a lot of cash may go to a money launderer who decides to
convert the cash into cashier's checks. The money launderer may take the
cash and go from bank to bank purchasing cashier's checks, each with a face
amount under [US] $10,000 ....The money launderer then can open a bank
account in the name of a fictitious company and deposit the checks into the
account. Because the deposits do not involve cash, the bank does not have to
report the transactions. Once in the bank, the funds can be transferred by
wire to an account, perhaps in Panama, where certificates of deposit can be
purchased. With those certificates, the criminal can go to another country England, for example - take out a loan using the certificates as collateral,
and the money returns to the United States.
Id. at 29.
33. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 46
(1988) [hereinafter STRATEGY REPORT]. "The techniques of money laundering are innumerable, diverse, complex, subtle, and secret." Id. "More than 95% of all money launderers identified by the [U.S.] federal government in the last few years have used at
least one of roughly a dozen methods." Andrew P. Doppelt, The Telltale Signs of Money
Laundering, 69 J. Accr. 1, 1 (1990).
INTERIM
34. STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 33; Alford, supra note 26, at 439; see, e.g.,
REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 (describing method of exchanging small denominations of
bills into larger denominations); BARIARA WEBSTER & MICHAEL S. MCCAMPBELL, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING:

RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION

JOIN FORCES 5 (1992) (describing method of depositing denominations of bills in a bank

and then transferring the bills to another bank); id. (describing method of depositing
denominations of bills into offshore entities and then transferring the denominations
into other entities). Additional methods include establishing trusts, forming corporations, and organizing banks. Alford, supra note 26, at 439-40. Evidence of money laundering include:
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always to disguise the existence, source, or use of illegitimate income.35

In the international field, "6 the typical money laundering
process involves several sophisticated stages.3 7 Criminally derived income is first removed, often electronically, from the jurisdiction where the income was created to a haven jurisdiction."8
(1) 'structuring accounts' by making repeated [small] deposits . . . (2) a
series of deposits into a single account by several individuals within a short
period of time; (3) transfers from accounts located at the same bank to a single account in another financial institution; (4) the transfer of funds to 'suspect' locations (Cayman Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Central American and Caribbean offshore banks);
(5) multiple transfers in or out of accounts held in trust by accountants or
attorneys; (6) obviously suspicious names used to open accounts; (7) names of
associations often used as front companies such as "Import/Export Limited,"
"Investment Company," "Trading Company," "S.A.," "Ltd.," or "GmbH;" (8)
very large deposits by small businesses; (9) unusual 'spikes' in accounts ...
and (10) false social security numbers.
Doppelt, supra note 33, at 1.
35. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 20; Barbot, supra note 30, at 166; see Clark,
supra note 25, at 469 (stating that "[t]he aim is thoroughly to confuse any investigator
attempting to trace the 'hot' money either by 'losing' it or by creating an intricate web
of transactions that is virtually impossible to follow.").
36. See generally Matthew R. Hall, An EmergingDuty to Report CriminalConduct: Banks,
Money Laundering,and the SuspiciousActivity Report, 84 Ky. L.J. 643, 672 (1996) (discussing
money laundering in international field).
37. Alford, supra note 26, at 440; see, e.g., Munroe, supra note 25, at 507-08 (discussing how international banking offers opportunities for "higher forms of money laundering.").
Generally [international banking] excludes the cruder or 'retail' form of
money laundering, namely the structuring of cash deposits to avoid the currency reporting laws, commonly called 'smurfing,' simply because international banking is not a cash oriented business. Rather, international banking
lends itself to larger non-cash deposits and to more sophisticated financial
transactions.
Id. at 507-08 (citations omitted). See generally Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal CriminalLaw: The Crime of Structuring Transactions,41 U. FLA. L. REv.
287 (1989) (discussing smurfs and smurfing).
An example of the sophistication involved in international money laundering is
where money is deposited into a foreign bank under a shell company, and then using
the money in the foreign bank as security, the shell company takes out loans, the money
of which is used in any country, for any purpose. WALTER, supra note 24, at 81.
38. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT (Feb. 6, 1990)
[hereinafter THE MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT]. "Haven jurisdictions" are those countries in which bank laws conceal the identity of depositors. Id. at 8; see Comstock, supra
note 25, at 143 (defining haven jurisdictions as those jurisdictions with strong bank
secrecy laws); Barbot, supra note 30, at 167 (providing examples of "haven jurisdictions," such as Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Panama).
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The criminally derived income is then deposited in one of the
jurisdiction's smaller banks, often under the name of a shell corporation 9 that is simultaneously created with the deposit transaction. 40 The criminally derived income is then transferred to a
larger international bank, where the income can be transferred
to other locations worldwide.4" Because of the complexity involved in the international money laundering process, international money launderers enjoy near immunity from prosecution.4 2
3. The Problem of Money Laundering
According to the United Nations, international money laundering amounts to approximately US$120 to US$500 billion a
year.4 3 International money laundering also touches in some
form or another more than 125 nations around the world.44 In
39. Comstock, supra note 25, at 143. A shell corporation is a fictitious corporation
established solely as a vessel for criminally derived income. Id.
40. Barbot, supra note 30, at 167.
41. Id. at 168.
42. Evans, supra note 30, at 211:
The use of multiple jurisdictions greatly exacerbates problems of investigation
and prosecution.... Once the proceeds of crime are successfully deposited in
the financial system, many laundering operators take the precaution of moving money, not just offshore, but through more than one tax haven and
through a maze of shell companies and respectable nominees. Investigators
run into obstacles that are nearly impossible to penetrate, even if they get
cooperation from their opposite numbers in the jurisdiction in question....
[T] he most sophisticated operations may effectively be immune from prosecution ....

Id. at 211.
43. STRATEGY Report, supra note 43, at 19-20. U.S. President Clinton recently addressed the growing problem of money laundering:
Criminal enterprises are moving vast sums of ill-gotten gains through the international financial system with impunity. We must not allow them to wash
the blood off profits from the sale of drugs, terrorism, or organized crime.
Nations should bring their banks and financial systems into conformity with
international anti-money laundering standards. We will work to help them do
so. And if they refuse, we will consider appropriate sanctions.
Money Laundering, supra note 24, at 28. After the speech, President Clinton issued an
executive order freezing the assets of the Mexican Cali cartel, its associates, and front
companies, estimated at 60 individuals and business, and prohibiting U.S. businesses
from dealing with them in the United States and abroad. Id. The list of businesses
involved included one of the largest drug store chains in Colombia, pharmaceutical
companies, chemical companies, import/export companies, holding companies, and
automobile dealerships. Id.
44. Money Laundering, supra note 24, at 28. Money laundering affects and subverts
a nation's banking and financial institutional system, small businesses, multinational
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contrast to these figures, the international community has collectively passed more than 50 pieces of new legislation against international money laundering.

45

With the increase in anti-money laundering legislation, however, the process of money laundering has become more sophisticated.4 6 Rather than directly depositing money in banks,
money launderers are resorting to the professional industry to
disguise the illegitimacy of the money. 47 Professionals will often
have only a circumstantial understanding of the money illegitimacy.4 8 Consequently, law enforcement authorities are less
likely to successfully prosecute professionals because of the mens
rea required under many anti-money laundering statutes.4 9
corporations, legislators, law enforcement, lawyers, judges, politicians, government officials, newspapers, and television media. Barbot, supra note 30, at 162; see Comstock,
supra note 25, at 144 (discussing societal consequences of money laundering).
45. Money Laundering, supra note 24, at 34.
46. See id. at 28 (stating that recent criminal investigations in the United States
confirm that as banks improve on anti-money laundering procedures, money launders
are diversifying the money laundering process).
In addition to structuring transactions to circumvent currency transaction reporting requirements, money launderers are opening accounts and engaging
in transactions using front companies and fictitious names. They are infiltrating legitimate businesses. They are using financial institutions other than
banks, such as currency exchanges and check cashiers, insurance companies,
securities broker/dealers, and other businesses that provide many of the same
types of services and opportunities to disguise and move funds. Money launderers are also purchasing fungible goods like TV sets, cameras, and cosmetics
that can be purchased in the United States and exported and sold abroad.
[T]he [U.S.] Government Accounting Office reported that because of the opportunities presented by our unpatrolled borders, cash easily leaves the
United States and is smuggled into countries without currency reporting requirements. The cash frequently returns in the form of large cashier's checks
or traveler's checks purchased in countries that have no identification or currency reporting requirements.
Id. at 30; see also Bruce Zagaris & Scott B. MacDonald, Money Laundering, Financial
Fraud, and Technology: The Perils of an InstantaneousEconomy, 26 GWJ. INT'L L. & EcON.
62, 82 (1992) ("Laundering techniques have become so sophisticated that additional
work is required by law enforcement authorities to combat them.").
47. Rachel Ratliff, Third-Party Money Laundering: Problems of Proof and Prosecutorial
Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & POL'v REv. 173, 173 (1996) ("As depositing drug money in banks
became a less effective avenue for money laundering, drug dealers turned to car dealers, real estate agents, and lawyers to spend and legitimize their wealth.").
48. American Bar Association Central andEast EuropeanLaw Initiative, 28 INT'L L. 835,
843-44 (1994).
49. See Ratliff, supra note 47, at 174 (stating that in United States, in criminal action against third parties who are not responsible for underlying illegal activity, proving
knowledge of funds' illegal source is difficult). Recently, the American Bar Association
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B. National Efforts Against Money Laundering
Nations around the world have made several efforts against
money laundering.5 ° These efforts have been recent phenomenons, however. 51 European efforts have historically focused on
combating money laundering solely in connection with drug
trafficking.52 Only recently have European efforts moved into
combating money laundering in connection with all major offenses. 53 In contrast, North American efforts have always prohibited money laundering in connection with all major offenses. 4
In either instance, however, the focus has always been to force55
fully combat money laundering.
1. European Efforts
Money laundering passes an estimated twenty-two billion
took up a discussion on the issue of mens rea requirements and money laundering.
American Bar Association Central and East European Law Initiative, supra note 48, at 835.
50. See generally Berta Esperanza Hernandez, RIP to IRP - Money Laundering and
Drug Trafficking Controls Score a Knockout Victory Over Bank Secrecy, 18 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 235, 275 (1993) (reviewing national efforts against money laundering). The
United Nations began addressing the problem of money laundering as early as 1985.
Frank C. Razzano, American Money Laundering Statutes: The Casefor a Worldwide System of
Banking Compliance Programs,3 D.C.L.J. INT'L L. & PRc. 277, 303 (1994). In 1988, the
United Nations adopted the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances ("U.N. Convention"). U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 82/15 (1988), 28
I.L.M. 493 (1989); see Razzano, supra, at 303 (discussing U.N. Convention). The U.N.
Convention had four objectives: to criminalize the laundering of drug trafficking proceeds; to authorize the confiscation of the proceeds derived from certain drug offenses;
permit the tracing of the proceeds; and to allow signatories to consider placing the
burden of proof regarding the proceeds' lawful origin on the owner of the proceeds.
Id. The U.N. Convention focused on money laundering solely in connection with drug
trafficking operations. Alford, supra note 26, at 437. Nevertheless, as of April 1993,
seventy five nations and the European Community have ratified the U.N. Convention.
See id. at 437 n.46 (listing signatory nations).
51. Zagaris & MacDonald, supra note 46, at 65. The late arrival of regional efforts
have been due to time, national sovereignty, and insufficient technology. Id. at 81-82.
52. See INTRIAGO, supra note 25, at 30-32 (reviewing European Community's efforts
against money laundering).
53. See id. (reviewing recent efforts of European Community).
54. See WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTn MONEY 209-14 (reviewing Central American

and South American efforts against money laundering); INTRiAGO, supra note 25, at 4647 (reviewing U.S. efforts against money laundering).
55. See Lawrence L.C. Lee, CombatingIllicit Narcotics Traffic in Taiwan: The Proposed
Money Laundering Control Act, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 189, 211 (1996) ("An international consensus has developed whereby money laundering is treated as a regulatory
and law enforcement priority."). See generally Zagaris & MacDonald, supra note 46, at
82-103 (discussing international community's specific measures to combat money laundering).
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pounds a year through Europe.5 6 In an effort to combat the
problem, European nations have participated in a variety of legislation. 57 The most significant piece of legislation is the European Community Council Directive 91/308 ("Directive"). 5' The
Directive requires all European Community members to
criminalize money laundering. 59 Currently, most European nations have met the Directive's mandate. 60
a. Great Britain
Great Britain's domestic drug trade earns roughly 2.4 billion pounds a year. 61 More than half of the 2.4 billion is laundered through Great Britain's financial centers.6 2 Preventing
the proliferation of money laundering, consequently, has become one of Great Britain's foremost objectives.65
Since 1986, Great Britain's chief piece of legislation against
money laundering has been the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act
("Offenses Act")64 The Offenses Act prohibits any person from
laundering income derived from drug trafficking. 65 Specifically,
the Offenses Act prohibits any person from retaining, controlling, or investing the proceeds of drug related activities belonging to a person they know or suspect of drug trafficking.6 6 The
56. John Willcock, City at Risk From Cleanup, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 27,
1993.
57. See Mortman, supra note 25, at S430 (reviewing European efforts against
money laundering).
58. Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77.
59. Id.
60. See Mortman, supra note 25, at S431-35 (reviewing European nations attempts
to comply with Directive).
61. Michael Hyland, Risks of Money Laundering, TIMES OF LONDON, Jan. 20, 1994.
62. Id.
63. See Willcock, supra note 56 (reporting on Great Britain's "tough new" money
laundering laws). "There is already a perception in [London] that the U.K. is tougher
on enforcing [money laundering] rules .... " Id.
64. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986, ch. 32 (Eng.)(effective January 1987); see
Lee, supra note 55, at 232 (addressing Offenses Act as "chief piece of legislation" against
money laundering); see also Criminal Justice Act, 1987, ch. 41 (Scotland) (setting forth
comparable act for Scotland).
65. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986, ch. 32, § 24. The Offenses Act also contains provisions for the investigation of suspected drug-derived assets prior to arrest, the
freezing of assets on arrest or upon issuance of a summons, and the issuance of confiscation orders following a conviction. Lee, supra note 55, at 232. The Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 1989 made it an offense to launder the funds of terrorist organizations. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989 (Eng.).
66. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986, ch. 32, § 24(1). Section 24 of the Of-
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Offenses Act provides for a penalty of up to fourteen years imprisonment. 67 Expanding the reach of the Offenses Act, the
British legislators implemented the Criminal Justice Act ("Act")
in 1993.68 The Act prohibits a person from laundering income
derived not only from drug trafficking, but from all serious offenses.6 9
Prior to the enactment of the Act, a person was permitted to
claim as a defense that he or she did not know or suspect that
the proceeds were related to drug trafficking. v In regard to
criminal offenses other than drug trafficking, persons, including
financial institutions, had a right, but not a duty, to report their
suspicions to law enforcement authorities.7 1 With the enactment
of the Act, however, it appears a person may no longer rely on
the defense.7 2
Both statutes have effectively combated money laundering. 71 Since the implementation of the statutes, British courts
have made more than 4500 confiscation orders.7 ' Drug dealers
specifically were deprived of more than forty-two million pounds
of illegitimate income. 7 5
b. France
ing.

France is a world leader in the effort against money launderFrance is not a major money laundering site, however.

fenses Act also imposes criminal sanctions on those persons, including financial institutions, who fail to inform law enforcement officials of any suspicion or belief that the
funds or investments of another may be linked to drug trafficking. Drug Trafficking
Offenses Act, 1986, ch. 32, § 24(1).
67. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986, ch. 32, § 24.
68. Criminal Justice Act, 1993 (Eng.).
69. Criminal Justice Act, 1993.
70. Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986, ch. 32, § 24(4). It is also a defense if the
accused can prove that he intended to disclose his suspicion or belief to law enforcement officials but there was a reasonable excuse for his failure to do so. Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986, ch. 32, § 24(4).
71. Mortman, supra note 25, at S447 n.144.
72. Criminal Justice Act, 1993.
73. Andy McSmith, Drug Barons Hang on to Pounds 28m Profit, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 14, 1994, at 1.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See France, 3 Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and International Financial
Crimes (Oceana), at 3-4 (June 1996) [hereinafter France] (discussing France's leadership
efforts against money laundering); see also France Battles Money Laundering with Small
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France is also not a drug producing or consuming country.78
France is, however, an important world financial center, and, as
such, a potential target for money launders.7 9
France has criminalized money laundering since as early as
1987.80 The French statute, like Britain's Offenses Act, prohibits
a person from knowingly laundering drug proceeds.8 1 The statute prohibits, specifically, a person from knowingly assisting in
any transaction for the investment, exchange, or concealment of
drug proceeds.8 2 The statute provides for a penalty of up to ten
years imprisonment and a fine of up to 500,000 francs.8 3 A separate statute prohibits a person from knowingly laundering drug
proceeds, internationally.8 4 The statute provides for the same
penalties as the statute prohibiting domestic money launder5
ing.

8

The French statute criminalizes money laundering only in
connection with drug trafficking. 86 The mens rea requirement
behind the French statute, consequently, requires proof that the
accused knew the proceeds involved were derived from drug
trafficking.8 7 As of 1994, however, French authorities have considered amending the statute to criminalize money laundering
in connection with all major organized crime and terrorist activi88
ties.
Arsenal, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT INTERNATIONAL, Feb. 1, 1992 (discussing France's

general efforts against money laundering).
77. See France, supra note 76, at 3 (stating that U.S. State Department does not
consider France major money laundering site). France does serve, however, as a transfer point for the movement of drug proceeds through Europe. Id.
78. Stephane Gazale, France, in BU'rrERWORTHS INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO MONEY
LAUNDERING 63 (Richard Parlour ed., 1995).

79. Id.
80. Gazale, supra note 78, at 63.
81. Public Health Code, art. L.627, 3 (Fr.). See generally Bruce Zagaris & Markus
Bornheim, When the Walls Come Tumbling Down, SECURITY MANAGEMENT, May 1, 1990, at
69 (discussing article L.627).

82. Public Health Code, art, L.627. The statute also prohibits a person from falsely
explaining the origin of drug proceeds. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Customs Code, art. 415.
86. Public Health Code, art. L.627; Customs Code, art. 415.
87. Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 81, at 69.
88. France, supra note 76, at 5. In February 1996, the French National Assembly
approved an amendment that would allow the state to seize the proceeds of illegal
activities ranging from prostitution and illegal arms sales to counterfeiting. Id. at 7.
However, a similar anti-laundering measure was approved by the French Leviate. Id.
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c. Italy

Italy is one of the leading money laundering centers in Europe.8 9 Italy is home to one of the most extensive organized
criminal networks in the world, the Italian Mafia. 90 The Italian
government estimates the total annual revenue of the Mafia at
US$75 billion. 91
Italy's efforts against money laundering predates to the late
1970s, where the Italian Penal Code's article 648bis punished
the intentional laundering of proceeds derived from either aggravated robbery, aggravated extortion, or kidnaping for extortion or terrorist purposes.9 2 On March 19, 1990, Italy extended
the scope of article 648bis by adding the fourth predicate offense of drug trafficking.93 On August 9, 1993, Italy further extended the scope of article 648bis by adding all predicate offenses of a serious nature.9 4 The statute provides for a penalty of
up to twelve years imprisonment and a fine of up to 30 million
lire.9 5
Unlike the French statute, the Italian anti-money laundering statute criminalizes money laundering in connection with all
major offenses.9 6 The mens rea requirement behind the Italian
statute, consequently, is broad.9 7 The Italian statute requires
proof that the accused knew the proceeds involved had an illicit
origin. 98
Differences between the two versions must be settled before the either bill may become
law. Id.
89. See Italy, 3 Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and International Financial
Crimes (Oceana), at 3 &5 (June 1996) [hereinafter Italy] (stating that money laundering
is significant problem in Italy and that Italy is one of leading money laundering centers
in Europe).
90. See id. (discussing Italian Mafia's role in Italy's money laundering problem).
91. Mortman, supra note 25, at S455. Other sources estimate the figure at US$400
billion. Italy, supra note 89, at 3.
92. Italian Penal Code, art. 648bis (1978). See generally Konstantinos D. Magliveras,
The Implementation of the 1991 EC Directive on Money Laundering in Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands, 8-AUT Irr'L L. PRAcricuM 89, 93 (1995) (discussing article 648bis).
93. Article 23 of Act 55/1990; see Magliveras, supra note 92, at 93 (discussing Act
55/1990).
94. Article 4 & 5, Act 328/1993; see Magliveras, supra note 92, at 94 (discussing Act
328/1993).
95. Italian Penal Code, art. 648bis; see Magliveras, supra note 92, at 93 n. 57 (discussing article 648bis's penalties).
96. Italian Penal Code, art. 648bis.
97. Razzano, supra note 50, at 301 n. 135.
98. Id.
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d. Germany
Like Italy, Germany is one of'the leading money laundering
centers in Europe.9 9 Germany suffers from an influx of organized criminal operations, particularly from East Germany, where
money laundering controls are weak. 10 0 Germany's government
that up to US$80 billion is laundered each year in Gerestimates
01
many.
Germany's efforts against money laundering began in 1992
with the passage of the Prevention of Organized Crime Act
("Crime Act"). 10 2 The Crime Act, implemented as Section 261
of the German Criminal Code, prohibits money laundering in
connection with any major criminal offense. 10 3 The Crime Act
provides for a penalty of imprisonment. 0 4
The mens rea requirement behind the German statute is
more liberal than either the Italian or French statutes.10 5 The
statute requires proof that the accused recklessly disregarded the
possibility that the proceeds involved were connected with a major criminal offense. 10 6 The German courts will see the accused
as acting recklessly if the criminal nature of the proceeds were
10 7
self evident.
2. North American Efforts
The United States led the effort against money laundering
in the North American and Central American regions.' 0 8 Other
99. See Germany, 3 Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and International Financial
Crimes (Oceana), at 3 (June 1996) [hereinafter Money Laundering in Germany] (stating
that U.S. and German officials consider Germany a major money laundering center).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Prevention of Drug Trafficking and Other Forms of Organized Crime
Act [hereinafter Prevention Act] (1992) (Ger.). See generally Dr. Michael Weller & Referendar jur Jens Rinze, Germany, in BUTTERWORTHS INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO MONEY
LAUNDERING 75 (Richard Parlour ed., 1995) [hereinafter Germany] (discussing the Prevention Act).
103. Penal Code, section 261 (Ger.).
104. Id.
105. See Money Laundering in Germany, supra note 99, 5 (discussing mens rea requirement).
106. Germany, supra note 102, at 76.
107. Id.
108. See Rudnick, supra note 22, at 227 (discussing U.S.role in effort against money
laundering).

1997]

MONEY LA UNDER1NG

269

nations, however, have quickly followed. 10 9 For example, Mexico and Canada have either passed new legislation or reinforced
existing legislation against money laundering. 1 10
a. Mexico
Critics rank Mexico second in the Western Hemisphere as a
money laundering center."1 In 1991, the Mexican government
12 Mexseized approximately US$90 million in laundered assetsi
ico has taken a number of regulatory and enforcement actions
13
to suppress its money laundering problem.'
On April 29, 1996, the Mexican legislature passed its second
anti-money laundering statute.1 1 4 Mexico's first statute, part of
its tax code, was enacted in 1989 and amended in 1993.115 The
first statute prohibits anyone from knowingly conducting a financial transaction knowing that the funds involved in the transrepresents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activaction
ity.1 1 6 The new statute differs little from the first statute.' 1 7 The
new law prohibits anyone from conducting a financial transaction, including an international transaction, knowing that the
funds involved in the transaction represent the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity, and with the further purpose of hiding
11 8
the origin, location, destination, or ownership of the property.
The new law also creates a presumption that the proceeds are
derived from an unlawful activity when its legitimate origin can109. See generally Evans, supra note 30 (reviewing general efforts in North American
and Central American regions).
110. SeeJohn R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, Mexico Enacts Law to Curb Money Laundering ofDrug Proceeds, 2 INrr'L L. UPDATE 64 (1996) (discussing recent Mexican legislation);
Evans, supra note 30, at 207-08 (discussing amendments to Canadian anti-money laundering statute).
111. See Mexico, 3 Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and International Financial
Crimes (Oceana), at 4-5 (Sept. 1996) [hereinafter Mexico] (discussing Mexico's status as
leading money laundering center).
112. Id. at 1.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Schmertz & Meier, supra note 110, at 64.
115. Responding to Pressure, Mexico Enacts Second Money Laundering Law, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, July 1, 1996 [hereinafter Mexico's Second Money Laundering Law].
116. Id.
117. Id. Mexico's legislators promulgated the new statute to suppress pressure
from the international community, particularly the United States, who was repeatedly
accusing Mexico's banks of colluding with money launders. Scmertz & Meier, supra
note 110, at 64.
118. Mexico's Second Money Laundering Law, supra note 115.
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9

b. Canada
Canada, although not historically a money laundering
center, is currently becoming one.1 2 ' As much as US$10 billion
of illegitimate proceeds are generated annually by drug trafficking in Canada. 121 Much of the proceeds are laundered through
1 22
Canada's extensive international banks.
On January 1, 1989, Canada issued its first money laundering statute.1 23 The statute prohibits anyone from transporting
property, knowing that the property was obtained from an enterprise crime or drug offense. 1 24 To date, the statute has proven
119. Id.
120. See Canada, 3 Money Laundering, Asset Forfeiture and International Financial Crimes (Oceana), at 1-2 (October 1996) [hereinafter Canada](discussing the Canada's growing problem of money laundering).
121. Id. at 1.
122. Id.
123. R.S.C., ch. 42, 2 (4th Supp.) (1989), amending Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C46 (1985) (Can.). The Canadian Legislature issued the statute simultaneously with
three additional amendments aimed at money laundering. R.S.C., ch. 42, 12 (4th
Supp. 1989), amending Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C., ch. N-1 (1985) (Can.); R.S.C., ch.
42, 10 (1989), amending Food and Drug Act, R.S.C., ch. F-27 (1985) (Can.); Income
Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1 (5th Supp. 1985) (Can.).
The Canadian Legislature issued the amendments immediately before a U.S. Senate declaration stating that Canada, along with Switzerland, the Bahamas, Luxembourg,
Hong Kong and Panama, were among the jurisdictions most used to launder drug income from the United States. DRUG MONEY LAUNDERING, BANKS AND FOREIGN POLICY, A
REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND POLICY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON NARCOTICS, TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.

20 (1990). According to one author, Canada may have deserved the distinction, primarily because of (1) Canada's extend border with the United States, (2) Canada's
considerable international banking system, (3) and Canada's economic integration
with the United States. John L. Evans, InternationalMoney Laundering:Enforcement Challenges and Opportunities, 3 Sw.J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 195, 200 (1996).
124. R.S.C., ch. C-46, 462.31. The statute reads in full,
(1) Every one commits an offense who uses, transfers the possession of, sends
or delivers to any person or place, transports, transmits, alters, disposes of or
otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any means, any property or any
proceeds of any property with intent to conceal or convert that property or
those proceeds and knowing that all or a part of that property or of those
proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of
(a) the commission in Canada of an enterprise crime offense or a designated drug offense; or
(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would
have constituted an enterprise crime offense or a designated drug
offense.

R.S.C., ch. C-46, 462.31. Designated drug offenses include drug trafficking, drug pos-
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effective.1 2 5
The language of the statute is broad. 126 Proving the element of knowledge, moreover, is unsophisticated. 127 The prosecution must prove that the accused intended to convert or conthe accused knew to be the proceeds of an
ceal property that
1 28
illegal nature.
session, conspiracy, and attempts, among others. Evans, supra note 123, at 201. Enterprise crime offenses include bribery, fraud, murder, robbery, and counterfeiting,
among others. Id. at 202.
The statute is a near mirror image of R.S.C. 1985, C. N-i, § 19.2, titled Laundering
Proceeds of Crime, which reads,
(1) No person shall use, transfer the possession of, send or deliver to any
person or place, transport, transmit, alter, dispose of or otherwise deal with, in
any manner and by any means, any property or any proceeds of any property
with intent to conceal or convert that property or those proceeds and knowing
that all or a part of that property or of those proceeds was obtained or derived
directly or indirectly as a result of
(a) the commission in Canada of an offense under section 4, 5, or 6
[drug related offenses]; or
(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would
have constituted an offense under section 4, 5, or 6.
R.S.C. 1985, C. N-1, § 19.2.
125. Evans, supra note 123, at 207-08. In discussing the Proceeds of Crime Act, the
umbrella legislation that included the money laundering statute, the author states that
since 1989, more than US$150 million assets have been seized and more than US$30
million assets have been forfeited. Id. Further, as a result of the legislation, some significant criminal operations have been greatly reduced. Id. Evans warns, however, that
any further judgments regarding the effectiveness of the legislation would be premature. Id. at 207.
126. Evans, supra note 123, at 202.
127. Id.
128. Id.; cf Regina v. Hayes, 104 C.C.C.3d 316 (Quebec Court of Appeal 1995). In
Hayes, the Court addressed whether section 19.2(1) of the Narcotic Control Act, supra
note 124, a statute analogous to Canada's principal money laundering statute, discussed
here, required prosecutors to prove that the defendant had knowledge that the proceeds he attempted to launder were from a one of section 19.2(1)'s listed offenses. Id.
The Court held that section 19.2(1) did require such specific proof. Id.. The Court
then went on to note that section 354 of the Criminal Code did not require the same
specificity. Id.
In the present case, there is no doubt that the prosecution could have very
well charged the appellant under s. 354 and it would have then avoided the
burden of proving this specificity as to knowledge of origin under the Narcotic
Control Act. The substance of the offense under s. 354 lies in the possession
of a thing and in the knowledge of its illegal origin.
Id. Because section 462.31 is more akin to section 354 then to section 19.2, in respect
to the specificity of the crimes named in the statutes, section 462.31's knowledge requirement should also only necessitate proof that the accused had knowledge of an
illegal origin, rather than a specific knowledge. Hayes, 104 C.C.C.3d at 316.
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c. The United States
In 1986, the United States Congress ("Congress") passed
the Money Laundering Control Act ("MLCA") .129 The MLCA
was Congress's first attempt at defining and prohibiting money
justification for the MLCA was threelaundering.' 30 Congress's
131
fold and interrelated.
Congress promulgated the MLCA, first, to respond to the
rise of money laundering activities in the United States. 132 Congress did so, more specifically, to paralyze drug trafficking and
similar organized crime operations. 13 3 Congress also promulgated the MLCA to stunt the growth of a rather new anomaly,
the professional money launderer, a profession born out of the
129. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57
(1988)).
130. See G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the 90's, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 149, 149 (1989). The MLCA was "tinkered" with two years later. Id. (citing Anti
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181). The MLCA was modified
again in 1990 and 1992. See Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4861
(1990) and Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat.
3672. See generally John K Villa, Banking Crimes: Fraud, Money Laundering and Embezzlement, 935 PLI/CoRP 445 (1996) (reviewing the history of MLCA).
131. See generallyJimmy Gurule, The Money LaunderingControlAct of 1986: Creatinga
New Federal Offense or Merely Affording FederalProsecutors an Alternative Means of Punishing
Specified Unlawful Activity?, 32 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 823, 823-26 (1995) (discussing legislative
history of MLCA).
132. See id. at 823-24.
There is more money being laundered than ever before, involving more people, and the schemes to wash dirty money are now often so sophisticated that
it is not unusual to find an intricate web of domestic and foreign bank accounts, dummy corporations and other business entities through which funds
are moved, almost instantaneously, by means of electronic transfers.
Id. at 824 n.3 (quoting House Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Comprehensive Money Laundering Prevention Act, H.R. Rep. No. 746, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
16 (1986)); see also Horvitz, supra note 3 at 138.
133. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 25, at 4-8. During the U.S. Senate deliberations for the Act, U.S. Senator Joseph Biden, Jr., stated, "Money laundering is a crucial
financial underpinning of organized crime and narcotics trafficking. Without money
laundering, drug traffickers would literally drown in cash. [They] need money laundering .... " S. Rep. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d See. 4 (1986).
U.S. Senator Dennis DeConcini also emphasized that "[w]ithout the means to
launder money, thereby making cash generated by a criminal enterprise appear to
come from a legitimate source, organized crime could not flourish as it now does."
Money Laundering: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 30 (1985); seeJason Shuck & Matthew E. Unterlack, Money Laundering, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 881, 882 (stating that without money laundering, "large scale criminal
activity could operate only at a small fraction of current levels, and with far less flexibility."); Gurule, supra note 131, at 823-24 (reviewing justifications for MLCA).
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necessities of organized crime operations.13 1
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considers
the last justification the MLCA's primary concern. 13 5 In United
States v. Johnson the Court looked into the legislative intent of the
MLCA. 1 6 The Court held that Congress designed the MLCA to
who assist
criminalize, in particular, the conduct of third persons
1 37
in the laundering of unlawfully derived proceeds.
The MLCA consists of two sections. 1 8 The first section, section 1956, contains ten separate crimes. 13 9 Section 1956 prohibits any person from knowingly engaging in a transaction involving the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity either with
134. See Gurule, supra note 131, at 825 ("[T]he enormous profits generated by

organized crime and the drug cartels have created, out of necessity, a new profession
within criminal circles - the professional money launder."); see also Clark, supra note
25, at 471 ("Money laundering now an extrememyl lucrative criminal enterprise in its
own right."). The professional money launderer may not necessarily be born out of a
discrete criminal profession. Id. He or she may be an accountant, a banker, or a lawyer. Id.; Gurule, supra note 131, at 825. Furthermore, the professional money launderer may not necessarily be a single individual. Id. For example, prior to the enactment of the Act, the United States Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement agency
dismantled eighteen criminal organizations dedicated to the laundering of illegitimate
proceeds. See id., at 825 n.6. During the House deliberations for the Act, U.S. Congressman Shaw stated: "I am sick and tired of watching people sit back and say, 'I am
not part of the problem, I am not committing the crime, and, therefore, my hands are
clean even though I know the money is dirty I am handling." Markup by the Subcommittee on Crime of H.R. 5077, Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Transcript, pp.
22-23, quoted in the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, H.R. Rep. No. 855, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986).
135. See United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1992).
136. Id. at 568-69.
137. Id. The Court reviewed the legislative history of the MLCA and found that
when passing the MLCA,
Congress had in mind the 'classic' case of laundering drug money - that is,
where a drug trafficker collects large amounts of cash from drug sales and,
acting with the complicity of a banker or other person in a financial institution, deposits the drug proceeds in a bank under the guise of conducting a
legitimate business transaction. The Act appears to be part of an effort to
criminalize the conduct of those third persons - bankers, brokers, real estate
agents, auto dealer and others - who have aided drug dealers by allowing
them to dispose of the profits of drug activity, yet whose conduct has not been
considered criminal under traditional conspiracy law.
Id.; see also United States v. LaBrunerie, 914 F.Supp. 340, 347 (W.D. Missouri 1995) (stating that Congress's clear intent in passing MLCA was to criminalize conduct of third
persons who assist in laundering of proceeds of unlawful activity).
138. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 & 1957.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1956; see Schuck & Unterlack, supra note 133, at 883 (stating section 1956 contains ten separate crimes).
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the intent to promote an unlawful activity, 140 with the intent to
violate the United States Internal Revenue Code,"' with the
knowledge that the transaction is designed to conceal some aspect of the proceeds 142 or with the knowledge that the transaction was designed to avoid a currency transaction reporting requirement. 143 Section 1956 also prohibits an individual from
knowingly transporting unlawful proceeds in the international
environment with the same intent or knowledge.1 4 4 Section
1956 also prohibits an individual from engaging in transactions
with the intent either to promote the carrying on of a particular
unlawful activity, 145 or to conceal some aspect of the funds, 1 46 or
to avoid a transaction reporting requirement, 147 if the property
is represented by an undercover officer to be the proceeds of a
148
particular unlawful activity.
The second section, section 1957, contains no subdivisions
on the basis of intent or knowledge. 149 Section 1957 prohibits
any person from knowingly engaging in a banking transaction
with a financial institution, involving criminally derived property
of a value greater than US$10,000. 150 Sections 1956 and 1957
have similar goals. 15' Scholars, however, consider section 1957
to have a potentially broader application than section 1956.152
U.S. prosecutors, however, seldom utilize section 1957.153
Judges and scholars, therefore, consider section 1956 the princi140. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i).
141.
142.
143.
144.

18
18
18
18

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 1956(a)(1)(A) (ii).
§ 1956(a) (1) (B) (i).
§ 1956(a)(1)(B) (ii).
§§ 1956(a) (2) (A), 1956(a) (2) (B) (i) & 1956(a) (2) (B) (ii).

145. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (A).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (3) (B).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (3) (C).
148. Id.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
150. Id.
151. Strafer, supra note 130, at 161.
152. See id. The two sections are different because of their separate evolutions. Id.
Section 1956 developed in the U.S. Senate, while section 1957 developed in the U.S.
House. Id. (citing S. 2683, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) and H.R. 5077, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986)).
153. See id. (noting that there has been relatively few prosecutions commenced
under section 1957); see also 'Specified Unlawful Activities' Vital in Laundering Cases, supra
note 3 (stating that section 1957 is "less used by federal prosecutors.").
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pal money laundering statute. 154
i. Section 1956(a)(2)(B)(i)
The United States Congress exclusively designed section
1956(a) (2) (B) (i) ("International Transportation Offense" or
"Offense") to proscribe international money laundering transactions. 155 The Offense prohibits any person from internationally
transporting monetary instruments, knowing that the monetary
instruments represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful
activity, and knowing that the transportation was designed to disguise some aspect of the proceeds, such as its ownership. 156
The Offense is a near mirror image of a prior 1956 subsection: (a) (1) (B) (i).5 Subsection 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) differs only
154. See 'Specified Unlawful Activities' Vital in Laundering Cases, supra note 3 (stating
that section 1956 is principal money laundering law).
155. See Strafer, supra note 130, at 163 (stating that subsection was exclusively
designed to proscribe international money laundering transactions); Charles Thelen
Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and
Banking Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAw. 69, 76 (stating that subsection "is essential to reach activities.., that are conducted outside the United States."); United States v. Piervinanzi, 23
F.3d 670, 680 (2d. Cir. 1994) (stating § 1956(a)(2) is designed to illegalize international money laundering transactions (citing S. Rep. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1986)); United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1991) (same).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). The section reads in full:
(a) (2) [w]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the
United States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place in
the United States from or through a place outside the United States (B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in part (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value
of the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than
twenty years, or both.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i). The section reads in full:
(a) (1) [w]hoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value
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in that it addresses property rather than a monetary instrument,
and a transaction rather than a transportation. 158 Judges and
scholars consider the subsections so closely related that they
often apply the rules applicable to one, onto the other, wherever
possible.' 5 9 Thus, a discussion of one may satisfy the discussion
1 60
of the other.
ii. The Elements
The Offense is divided into five elements, all of which the
prosectution must prove to convict a suspected money launderer. 16 ' The elements are (1) an actual or attempted transportation, transmittal, or transference of (2) a monetary instrument
or fund (3) into or out of the United States (4) with the knowledge that (a) the monetary instrument or fund represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and (b) the transportation, transmittal, or transference is designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or the control of
the proceeds; and (5) the proceeds must, in fact, come from a
162
specified unlawful activity.
iii. The Actus Reus and Attendant Circumstances
The first element is the actus reus of the offense. 6 ' The
element requires that there be, or attempt to be, a transportation, transmittal, or transference. 16 4 Although Congress defined
most of the operative terms in the statute, it failed to define
of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.
ld.
158. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a) (2) (B) (i).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that there is "overlap" between two subsections); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194,
1204 (3d. Cir. 1994) ("[W]e find the distinction [between subsections 1956(a)(1) and
1956(a) (2) (B)] so slight"); Villa, supra note 130, at 504 (stating that elements of subsection (a) (2) (B) "are all drawn from those in subsection 1956(a) (1) (B).").
160. See Carr, 25 F.3d at 1204 (analyzing section 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) to come to conclusion on section 1956(a) (2) (B) (i)).
161. See John K. Villa, Elements of Principal Ciminal Statutes Applicable to Financial
Institutions, C351 ALI-ABA 181, 205-206 (1988) and Schuck & Unterlack, supra note
133, at 886 (offering similar break down of elements).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (B) (i).
163. BLACK'S, supra note 6, at 36. Actus reus is defined as the physical aspect of a
crime. Id.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2).
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these terms.16 5 The legislative history, however, provides guidance as to their meaning.' 6 6
As enacted in 1986, the International Transportation Offense encompassed only the actus reus of transports. 16 7 Courts
assumed that Congress intended the ordinary meaning of that
term and, thus, construed it as the physical carrying of a thing
from one place to another.1 6 8 But the 1988 amendments1 69 to
section 1956, which changed transports to transports, transmits,
or transfers, made clear that such an interpretation failed to encompass all of Congress's intent. 17' The three words together
to include virtually every kind of movement
are now considered
171
imaginable.
In contrast, the second element of monetary instrument or
funds, which is an attendant circumstance, 1 72 is partly defined in
the statute.1 73 ' Monetary instrument means coin or currency,
travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders,
or investment securities and negotiable instruments, in bearer
74
form or otherwise in such form that title passes upon delivery.'
1 75
Checks.
cashier
The definition has been assumed to include
The term, funds, is not defined in the statute. 76 The U.S.
Department of Justice considers the term to include wire transfers or any other electronic fund transfers. 1 77 The U.S. Court of
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (defining operative terms of statute).
166. See Villa, supra note 130, at 503 (turning to legislative amendments to find
meaning of section 1956's actus reus terms).
167. Id.
168. See Strafer, supra note 130, at 163 n.86 (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9
(1962))).
169. See supra note 130 (discussing Anti Drug Abuse Act amendments).
170. Villa, supra note 130, at 503. However, Congress annexed the terms "transmits" and "transfers" to "transports" but failed to define them again. Id.
171. Id.; see Strafer, supra note 130, at 163 n.86 (stating, "if the term 'transports'
already encompassed 'transmissions' and 'transfers,' then [the] changes would have
been both unnecessary and redundant."). But see Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d at 678 (impliedly
rejecting Strafer's position).
172. See BLACK'S, supra note 6, at 127. An attendant circumstance is a "fact surrounding an event." Id.; see supra note 6 (discussing role of elements in crime statutes).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (5).
174. Id.
175. See Plombeck, supra note 155, at 76 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (7) (A), 51 Fed.
Reg, 30233 (1986) (proposed rules) and 52 Fed. Reg. 11436 (1987) (final rules on definition of 'monetary instruments')).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c).
177. Justice Department Monograph (Appendix 8A at App. 8-11, n. 59); see Strafer,
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agrees, stating that because monetary instrument includes everything that can be carried, the
term, funds, must therefore have an independent significance,
17
and in particular include wire transfers.
The third element requires that the monetary instrument or
fund be transported, transmitted, or transferred into or out of
the United States. 179 Any movement of monetary instrument or
funds that does not originate or terminate in the United States is
not within the scope of the statute. 80° At least one court has
held, however, that a transfer of funds from one U.S. bank to
another, prior to their transfer abroad, is equivalent to directly
transferring out of the United States. l8 '
Skipping the fourth element for the moment, the fifth and
final element, which requires the proceeds to be, in fact, the
product of a specified unlawful activity, requires cross reference
to subsection (c) (7) (D) of section 1956.182 That subsection provides a list of offenses which are specified unlawful activity."8 ' A
majority of these offenses are U.S. offenses 1 4 and only a handful
are foreign. 8 5 To date, they include extortion, narcotics trafficking, fraud against a foreign bank, kidnaping, robbery, and
acts of terrorism.1 6 In whole, then, the fifth element requires
supra note 130, at 163 n.86 (criticizing Department's view: "to stretch the scope of the
term 'funds' would both conflict with the ordinary meaning of the term 'transport' and
eviscerate the care Congress obviously took to confine the term 'monetary instruments'
to negotiable instruments.").
178. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d at 678-79; United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 101516 (9th Cir. 1991).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (B).
180. Villa, supra note 3, at 503.
181. Id.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D).
183. Id. There are more than 100 "specified unlawful activities" .covered, ranging
from drug trafficking and labor racketeering to water pollution and copyright infringement. Id.
184. See Hays & Allen, supra note 3, at A4 (reporting that Raul Salinas case is made
more difficult because of limited number of foreign crimes that are covered by U.S.
money laundering statutes).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (7) (D).
186. See Foreign Crimes that are "Specified Unlawful Activities" Under U.S. Money Laundering Law, MONEY LAUNDERINc ALERT, Jan. 1, 1996 (listing extortion, fraud, kidnaping,

narcotics, and robbery as "specified unlawful activities"); New Law Extends U.S. Laundering Law to More Foreign Crimes, MONEY LAUNDERINc ALERT, July 1, 1996 (listing acts of

terrorism as murder or destruction of property by means of explosive or fire; assassination of a presidential, congressional or cabinet officer; transactions in nuclear materials; and use of weapons of mass destruction); see also Hays & Allen, supra note 3, at A4
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prosecutors to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the pro18 7
ceeds were in fact derived from one or more of these offenses.
iv. The Mens Rea
The fourth element is section 1956(a) (2) (B) (i)'s mens rea
requirements, both of which necessitate proof of knowledge."8 '
First, a defendant must have knowledge that the monetary instrument or fund involved in the transportation represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. 1 9 Second, a defendant must have knowledge that the transportation itself was
designed to conceal or disguise the nature of the proceeds.190
Both mens rea requirements are distinct."' 1 The first refers
to the defendant's own knowledge. 1 92 The second, which in the
statute is phrased in the passive voice, refers to the knowledge of
someone else's intent, the intent of the person who designed the
transaction. 193 Thus, it requires the defendant to have known,
not that he himself wanted to disguise the nature of the proceeds, but that another person wanted to disguise the nature of
the proceeds.19 4 The first mens rea requirement, in contrast, requires that the defendant himself know that the proceeds involved in the transportation were derived from some form of unlawful activity.' 9 5 The defendant need not have known, however,
the specific crime that generated the proceeds.' 9 6 This precludes the allegation that the defendant thought that the property involved represented the proceeds of a crime not covered
within the term, specified unlawful activity. 9 ' The defendant
need not know that the crime that generated the funds was a
specified unlawful activity, nor even the specific crime that gen(reporting that banking regulators in Washington are considering plan to add official

corruption to list of unlawful activities).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (7) (D).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (B).
190. Id.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2).
192. Id.
193. Strafer, supra note 130, at 162.
194. Id.
195. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2).
196. Plombeck, supra note 155, at 73.
197. Id. at 73 n.28. It was reported to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee that
such a defense had been successfully raised in other countries whose statutes did not
draw the distinction. Id.
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erated the funds, only that the funds were the proceeds of some
1 98
kind of crime.
Both mens rea requirements mandate a high degree of
proof.1 99 Courts permit, however, the use of circumstantial evidence to prove them. 2°° Ajury, thus, is allowed to infer from the
evidence that a defendant knew the monetary instrument involved in the transportation represented the proceeds of some
unlawful activity and that another person intended to disguise
the nature of the proceeds.20 1
C. The Salinas-CitibankAffair
On February 28, 1995, Mexican authorities arrested Raul
Salinas de Gortari for the assassination of Jose Francisco Ruiz
Massieu.2 °2 Raul Salinas is the infamous older brother20 3 of Car198. Id. at 73-74; Strafer, supra note 130, at 166. Section 1956(c) (1) provides that,
the term "knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity" means that the person
knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from
some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a
felony under State, Federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such
activity is specified in paragraph (7) [listing specified crimes that fall within the
statute].
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (1). The legislative history behind section 1956 indicates that this
knowledge requirement was the result of a compromise. Strafer, supra note 130, at 166.
During the Senate hearings on the proposed legislation, the proper mens rea requirement generated a great deal of debate. Id at 166 n.91. Law enforcement authorities
wanted the use of a relaxed mens rea requirement to ensure that the Treasury Department would have an ability to deal with money laundering. Id. Civil liberty groups and
representatives from the financial community, in contrast, wanted a high mens rea requirement, such as knowledge, to protect legitimate business from prosecution. Id.
Congress, having previously rejected the standards of "reason to know" and "reckless
disregard" ultimately adopted the "knowledge" standard but significantly relaxes what
the defendant had to know to be found guilty. Id. at 166.
199. Plombeck, supra note 155, at 71. Consequently, the focus of most U.S. money
laundering cases is on the mens rea requirements. Id.
200. Shuck & Unterlack, supra note 133, at 888.
201. Id.; see Plombeck, supra note 155, at 73 (stating that particular knowledge of
fact or circumstance surrounding transaction may satisfy mens rea requirement if fact
or circumstance clearly indicates illegal nature of transaction).
202. Id. at A15; Julia Preston, Officials Find Bones and Hint Link to Salinas, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1996, at A12. According to the New York Times's report of the assassination, a "gunman walked up to Mr. Ruiz Massieu at mid-afternoon on Sept. 28, 1994
on a crowded street in the heart of Mexico City, shooting [sic] him once at point blank
range." Id. The gunman has since been convicted for the killing. Id.
The Wall StreetJournal's version of the assassination adds to the underlying story:
A prominent politician, one of the president's closest allies and his former brother-in-law, is murdered in public. The incensed president asks the
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los Salinas de Gortari, the former president of Mexico.2" 4 Ruiz
Massieu was the Secretary General of the Institutional Revolutionary Party,2" 5 which was, at the time, the second most powerful political position in Mexico." 6
During the investigation of Raul's arrest, 20 7 authorities uncovered more than US$300 million dollars in illegitimate
deceased man's brother to head the investigation. The investigator rounds up
the suspects and allegedly tortures them for confessions. After a few weeks he
has more than a dozen confessed conspirators in jail. One other conspirator,
a national legislator and the alleged mastermind of the assassination remains
uncaptured.
The president leaves office thinking that the case is solved, but his own
brother is arrested by a new investigator less than three months later. The
main piece of evidence is the testimony of one of the conspirators, who after a
prolonged silence says that the former president's brother ordered the assassination. The witness claims that he did not come forward earlier because he
was pressured by the previous investigator.
Sarmiento, supra note 2, at A15.
203. See Anthony DePalma & Peter Truell, ManeuveringMillions, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, June 6, 1996, at A25. "[Raul was] notorious for his lavish way of life. He was
often in the company of beautiful women, and he maintained an expensive stable of
horses for equestrian competitions in Switzerland and the United States." Id. "There
seems to be no question that Raul Salinas was a scoundrel." Sarmiento, supra note 2, at
A15.
204. Sarmiento, supra note 2, at A15. Raul's arrest shattered a long tradition in
Mexico of impunity for close relatives of former Presidents. Preston, supra note 202, at
A12.
Carlos Salinas de Gortari served as Mexico's president from 1988 to 1994.
Sarmiento, supra note 2, at A15. He fled Mexico soon after his brother's arrest. Id.
Although he has not officially been linked to his brother's investigation, he has issued a
statement of his innocence. Stephen Fidler & Leslie Crawford, Britain Freezes Dollars
23m Accounts in Drug Probe, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1995, at 3. In it he said he felt deceived
by his brother, and that he was willing to return to Mexico to defend his reputation. Id.
He now lives in exile in Ireland. Preston, supra note 202, at A12. The scandal has
shattered the reputation he earned as a bold modernizer of Mexico. Id.
Raul's arrest also had broader implications. Geri Smith & Amy Borrus, 'Salinas' is
Fast Becoming a Dirty Word, Bus. WK., Dec. 25, 1995, at 54. All of Mexico was fearful of
whether there would be further arrests. Id. Those who did business with Raul were
concerned about being incriminated, while others were concerned that the investigation would undermine attempts to stabilize the Mexican economy. Id.; see Colin McMahon, Crisis of Confidence Rocking Mexico, CHI. T~i., Sept. 26, 1996, at 6 (reporting that "a
national business group, reflecting the jitters.., called on Mexican prosecutors to end
their 'witch hunt."').
205. Preston, supra note 202, at A12. The Institutional Revolutionary Party was, at
the time, the governing political party of Mexico. Id.
206. Craig Torres & Joel Millman, Grisly Letter Breathes New Life into Mystery of Mexico's Skeleton, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1996, at A13.
207. See Preston, supra note 202, at A12. Raul Salinas was arrested on February 28,
1995. Id.
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money, all allegedly belonging to Raul. 20 8 According to news reports, the authorities uncovered the money in seventy different
bank accounts, in over seven different countries. 20 9 They also
discovered twenty plots of land, six mansions, and thirteen apartments.

210

The authorities considered the money illegitimate because
of Raul's questionable reputation. 211 During his brother's reign,
212 Raul
Raul was allegedly linked to the Mexican drug cartels.
208. See Laurie Hays, U.S. is PressingProbe of How Citibank Handled $100 Million for
Raul Salinas, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1996, at A4 (reporting that the accounts "came to
light" after Raul's arrest); 60 Minutes, supra note 2 (reporting that the accounts were
valued at US$300 million).
The money was discovered through a twist of unlikely events. See DePalma &
Truell, supra note 203, at A25. A car allegedly to have been used in the assassination of
Ruiz Massieu was found in the driveway of a house called "La Casa Chica" - the house
of women. Id. Police checked the ownership of the house and learned it was registered
in the name of one Juan Guillermo Gomez Gutierrez, a rather indistinguishable name.
Id. However, the police also checked the ownership of the car. Id. The name Juan
Guillermo Gomez Gutierrez also came up but with a distinguishablephotograph, that of
Raul Salinas de Gortari. Id. Juan Guillermo Gomez Gutierrez was an alias used by Raul
to conceal the ownership of the house as well as the car. Id. The Mexican police immediately put out an international alert on the counterfeit name. Id.
An unwitting party to Raul's affair was his third wife, Paulina Castanon. Id. On his
demand, she left Mexico for Switzerland to close his accounts and transfer his money
into a trust at Liechtenstein. Id. Unaware of the international alert, she was arrested by
Swiss police for attempting to maneuver money in one of Raul's accounts. Id. She was
later released, but the incident enabled the Swiss police to open a safe deposit box
belonging to the account, where insider, they found a passport belonging to Juan Guillermo Gomez Gutierrez, but with a photograph of Raul Salinas. Id. (citing 1995 deposition of Raul Salinas taken by Swiss authorities and made available to the New York
Times). In Raul's deposition, he states that he asked his wife to go because he knew the
Mexican government had found out about his passport under his alias, and that he
wanted to keep officials from seizing it. Id. The evidence confirmed the international
alert and launched a world wide search for other accounts hidden under the counterfeit name. Fidler & Crawford, supra note 204, at 3.
The search was conducted by Mexican, American and Swiss authorities, which was
made possible by international agreements for mutual assistance. David Adams, Money
Trail Leads to Model Bank, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, April 22, 1996, at 1A.
209. 60 Minutes, supra note 2; News in Brief" Salinas Bank Accounts Found, THE
GUARDIAN (London), June 24, 1996, at 8.

210. Adams, supra note 208, at IA. This was considered an "astronomical balance
sheet, even for the generous boundaries traditionally allowed to a Mexican ruling
class." DePalma & Truell, supra note 203, at A25.
211. See 60 Minutes, supra note 2 (reporting that "Raul's money, allegedly, is $300
million, said to be, plain and simple, loot from illegal dealings in payoffs, in bribes, and
possibly drugs.").
212. See Smith & Borrus, supra note 204, at 54 (stating that according to sources in
Washington, officials of Bush and Clinton Administrations have long suspected that
some members of Salinas administration had links to Mexican drug cartels); McMahon,
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was also allegedly an extortionist, appropriating millions of dollars from wealthy businessmen involved with his brother's administration.2 1 According to news reports, the most compelling
evidence was Raul's salary. 2 14 During his brother's reign, Raul
215
made no more than US$190 thousand a year as a civil servant.
Raul is currently in a maximum security prison in Mexico,2 1 6
awaiting trial for murder and inexplicable enrichment, a Mexican criminal offense that proscribes the unexplained accumulation of wealth greater than a government official's income.21 7
Raul, however, maintains that the money is from legitimate
sources. 21 8 Raul claims the money came from investors who
wanted to establish a fund abroad that would make investments
supra note 204, at 6 (stating that Raul had links with Mexico's most powerful drug
cartels). But see Jose de Cordoba & Laurie Hays, U.S. Wins Big Mexican Narcotics Case,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1996, at A18 (stating that Raul allegedly had links to Juan Garcia
Abrego, reputed to be one of Mexico's most powerful drug kingpins, but that during
trial on October of 1996, when Abrego was convicted on federal charges for smuggling
nearly 15 tons of cocaine into United States, few "explosive revelations" had been produced confirming allegation).
213. McMahon, supra note 204, at 6; CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast,
March 7, 1996). During his brothers reign as president, Mexico privatized a host of
their government owned corporations. Id. "The word in Mexico was that if you wanted
to get a deal on one of those privatizations... you needed to pay ten percent to Raul."
Id. He knew the administration's inner workings, and most importantly, had the president's ear. Id. "He even earned the nickname 'Mr. Ten Percent' for the cut he allegedly took to push the deals through." McMahon, supra note 204, at 6.
Before the privatization of Mexico's government owned corporations, Mexico had
two billionaires. Three years later, it had twenty-four and ranked fourth in the world in
the number of billionaires after the United States, Germany, and Japan. 60 Minutes,
supra note 2. "All of the [billionaires], in one way or another, owe[d] their ability to be
so successful in business to the connections with the Salinas administration." Id. (statement of Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, independent congressman and head of first Mexican
congressional investigation of corruption).
214. Hilton, supra note 2, at 1.
215. Laurie Hays, Friend in the Citi: PrivateBanker Wooed, then Sought to Drop Mexico's
Raul Salinas, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1996, at Al.
216. Preston, supra note 202, at A12.
217. Salinas ProbeExamines Citibank, PRIVATE BANKER INT'L, June 1, 1996, at 8. Inexplicable enrichment, also known as "illicit enrichment", appears to be equivalent to the
U.S. charge of corruption or extortion. See Hays, supra note 3, at A4 (reporting that
Raul was charged for "plotting a political assassination and 'illicit enrichment'"); 60
Minutes, supra, note 2 (stating that 'inexplicable enrichment' is legal label for corruption); NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, June 21, 1996) (reporting that Raul
was charged with murder and corruption); Salinas ProbeExamines Citibank, supra (stating
that "inexplicable enrichment" may be equivalent to extortion).
218. See Preston, supra note 202, at A12. As for the murder charge, Raul denies it,
arguing that he was accused as part of a campaign by the current president, Ernesto
Zedillo, to discredit his brother. Id.
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back into Mexico.2 t9 Mexican authorities have yet to verify the
claim.22 °
In the United States, Raul's arrest has opened an investigation into Citibank, one of the largest banks in the world.22
Through his lawyers, Raul had implicated Citibank as the party
responsible for accepting, depositing, and disseminating most of
his money out of Mexico. 222 Specifically, he had pointed to Amy
223 According to Raul,
Elliot ("Elliot"), a Citibank vice president.
22 4
she had devised the whole strategy.

Citibank officials deny misconduct. 2 25 According to statements issued by their corporate headquarters, Citibank thoroughly examined all transactions with Raul and found no evidence of impropriety.2 26 According to her lawyer, Elliot also in219. Hays & Allen, supra note 3, at A4.
220. See Strange $50 Million Business Transaction, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 1,
1996, at 6. One such "investor friend" has since come forward. Id. The friend is telecommunications entrepreneur Carlos Peralta, head of Crupo lusa, one of Mexico's
largest companies, and the Mexican partner of Bell Atlantic, U.S.A. Id. At an interview
in Mexico City held soon after Raul's arrest, Peralta confirmed that in April of 1994, he
gave Raul US$50 million, no receipts given, no questions asked. Id. He also said that
he did not give Raul the money in exchange for any favors or privileges. Id. At the
time, Mexican financial markets were taking a beating and the project Raul had offered
seemed like a "golden opportunity." Id.
This supports Raul's contention that he received the money from a group of investors, but in a questionable fashion: no contracts were signed, no other investor has
since come forward, and Peralta's money apparently ended up in a Swiss bank account
under an assumed name. Id. As Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, an independent congressman
in Mexico, said, "what kind of legitimate operation requires a $50 million dollar deposit
in Switzerland under the name of someone who doesn't exist?" Id.
221. See DePalma & Truell, supra note 203, at A25. The Justice Department announced for the first time during the week ofJune 6, 1996, that it had opened a criminal investigation into Salinas's transactions at Citibank. Id. "The aim is to determine if
Citibank violated American laws prohibiting banks from knowingly helping criminals
hide illicit earnings." Id.
222. 60 Minutes, supra note 2. Raul claimed that, at the least, Citibank arranged to
get US$100 million of his money out of Mexico and onto U.S. soil' Id. His statement
and the ensuing investigation concerned Citibank. See Smith & Borrus, supra note 204,
at 54 (reporting that Citibank Mexico braced for raid by investigators). For quite a
while Citibank had been enjoying a "privileged status" in Mexico, primarily because it
did not pull out in the late 1930s when other banks withdrew after the Mexican government's nationalization of the oil industry. Adams, supra note 208, at IA.
223. 60 Minutes, supra note 2.
224. Hays & Allen, supra note 3, at A4; 60 Minutes, supra note 2.
225. Adams, supra note 208, at IA.
226. Id. Citibank announced, "We have always thoroughly examined all the questions about alleged irregularities." Id. "We have not found any reason to believe that
we have acted illegally or unethically." Id.
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sisted that everything she had done with Raul's money was in
accordance with Citibank policy and was approved by her supervisors. 2277 News reports, however, state that Citibank's involve'

227. 60 Minutes, supra note 2. Interestingly, Citibank chairman, John Reed, has
said that neither he nor other senior managers knew anything about Raul Salinas's
accounts until after Mr. Salinas was arrested in February. Hays & Allen, supra note 3, at
A4. Nevertheless, Citibank is standing firmly in support of Elliot. Id.
U.S. investigators recently deposed Amy Elliot. See Hays, supra note 208, at Al.
The deposition took place at the U.S. attorney's office in Manhattan by representatives
of the Mexican attorney general, the Swiss attorney general, and the U.S. Department
of Justice. 60 Minutes, supra note 2.
Asked if she had tried to determine where he derived all the money, Elliot replied
that Raul Salinas told her he had sold a construction company, and that inquiring further would be "like asking the Rockefellers where they got their money." Id.
Analysts remained skeptical: "How could anyone named Salinas using his own
name deposit millions of dollars without questions being raised?" asked Ronald K. Noble, a former U.S. undersecretary of the Treasury who heads an international task force
on money laundering. DePalma & Truell, supra note 1, at A25.
The following information was derived from Elliot's deposition reprinted in the
Wall StreetJournal. Hays, supra note 208, at Al: Amy Elliot was introduced to Raul in
1992 by Carlos Hank Rhon, a prominent Mexican businessman and a longtime client of
Citibank's private bank - an operation set up to deal discreetly with wealthy individuals. Id. Mr. Hank Rhon said that while a lot of Mexicans said they knew the famous first
family, "he in fact knew the Salinases rather well." Id. He also mentioned that Raul had
sold a construction company and needed to open an account to deposit the proceeds.
Id.
After two meetings, Elliot agreed to accept the funds, but without asking some very
important questions, such as the construction company's name, its worth, receipts of
sale, or why he even wanted to open up an overseas account. Id. Her deposition also
reveals that she did not research his employment records or ask for any bank references, a standard procedure for all new accounts. Id. Rather, on the word of Mr. Hank
Rhon and her own general knowledge, she went ahead and wrote letters of instruction
setting up a trust in London and Zurich and a New York checking account funded with
a deposit of US$100 thousand. Id.
Elliot also revealed that as their relationship grew, Raul began to seek Elliot's assistance more frequently. Id. In one instance, he asked her to inspect a California house
he wanted to buy, which she did, creating a corporation to be its owner. Id. She also
took pains to preserve his confidentiality, often bypassing the Mexico City office and
speaking over the phone in code. Id.
When his brother's term was nearing its end, Raul asked Elliot to move all of his
accounts out of Mexico. Id. Again she asked no questions, relying only on her old
assumptions. Id. The subsequent plan was complex, but the basic principle was to get
the money out without being traceable. Id. It called for Paulina Castanon to take cashier's checks for pesos to Citibank's Mexico City branch. Id. Citibank would then
change the pesos into dollars and wire the money to New York to a "concentration
account" for wire transfers. Id. They would come marked attention Ms. Elliot, who
would pick them up and personally ship them to the accounts in London and Switzerland. Id.
Throughout the affair, as suspicious as it may have seemed, Elliot failed to inquire
into any matters. Id. "It didn't seem strange to me," she said to the investigators, "that
he wanted to do it this way... ; [H]e was a Salinas." Id. The plan came to an end when
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ment with Raul's money is uncontested. 22' The news reports
also contend that Citibank knew the money might have been
illegitimate. 229 As for Elliot, analysts say it is hard to understand
how she could not have had suspicions about the money in Salinas's accounts, considering his officially reported earnings, his
conspicuous taste of living, his reputation among ordinary Mexicans as a questionable operator, 230 and her bank's own rules regarding dubious funds.2 31
232
U.S. authorities are currently investigating the matter.
Specifically, they are inquiring into whether Citibank and Amy
Elliot violated U.S. law prohibiting a bank or person from knowingly transporting illigitmate money across international borders
codified as Section 1956.233
Elliot discovered from a news report, the first report she attests she ever read on Raul,
that he was suspected of being behind the September 1994 killing of Jose Francisco
Ruiz Massieu. Id.
228. New Twist Reported in Salinas Probe, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Sept. 18, 1996, at 12.
229. Id.
230. DePalma & Truell, supra note 203, at A25; see Adams, supra note 208, at IA
("even people who liked President Salinas knew that his brother was shady."). Mexico is
considered among the ten most corrupt countries on a list of forty-one nations. Diego
Cevallos, Mexico: Salinas Casts Corruption Shadow, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 25, 1996.

231. Adams, supra note 208, at IA. Elliot's bank's rules consist of "Know You Customer" guidelines. DePalma & Truell, supra note 203, at A25. In her testimony at the
1994 trial of a former colleague accused of money laundering she gave a detailed description of the guidelines:
Know your client, at least in our bank is part of the culture. If you come in
with a prospect and/or name of a prospect, you will be sure to be asked, 'Who
is this person, what do they do, who introduced them to you?' by at least three
or four people higher than you. It's just the way it is.
Id.
We visit our clients 10 to 12 times a year in their country. They come back
three or four times to New York. It's obviously a growing kind of thing and
not just in knowing your customer [to] make sure you know what's going on,
but because the relationship can grow deeper the more you know this person.
This is why we go to their business, this is why we remember birthdays. It just
increases depth .... It's too risky not to do due diligence, not to know who you
are dealing with.
Adams, supra note 208, at IA.
As to having Mexican officials as clients, Elliot said, "if you get to know them ... it's
fairly obvious, I think. Mexican officials are talked about a lot." Id. Elliot also noted
that she recognized that government officials in Mexico had a reputation for abusing
their official positions for personal enrichment; she said it was not difficult to know who
was trustworthy. Id.
232. DePalma & Truell, supra note 1, at Al.
233. Id.
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II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
1956'S FIRST MENS REA REQUIREMENT
The Sixth Circuit has addressed the use of section 1956 in
more than six cases.2 34 In three of these cases, the Sixth Circuit
has specifically addressed section 1956's mens rea requirements. 23 5 In all three of the cases, the Sixth Circuit, in contrast
to the Third and Fourth Circuits, used language interpreting
section 1956's first mens rea requirement as requiring proof that
the accused knew the proceeds involved in the alleged money
laundering transaction represented proceeds derived from a specific unlawful activity, rather than from some form of unlawful
activity as expressly mandated by the statute. 23 6 The principal
decision in which the Sixth Circuit interpreted section 1956's
first mens rea requirement as requiring such specific knowledge
237
was in United States v. McDougald.
A. Pre-McDougald Decisions
The Sixth Circuit first addressed section 1956 in United
234. See United States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555 (1994) (addressing
1956(a)(1)(B)(i)); United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 119 (1994)(addressing
§ 1956(a) (1) (B) (i)); United States v. McDougald, 990 F.2d 259 (1993) (addressing
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)); United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531 (1993)(addressing
§§ 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) & 1956(a) (1) (B) (i)); United States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543 (1993) (addressing § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i)); United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330 (1992) (addressing §§ 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) & 1956(a) (2) (B) (i)); see also United States v. Oleson, 44 F.3d
381 (1995)(addressing § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)); United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228
(1992) (addressing § 1956(a) (3)); United States v. Loehr, 966 F.2d 201 (1992) (addressing § 1956(a) (3)).
235. See Bencs, 28 F.3d at 561-63 (addressing § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)'s mens rea requirements); McDougald, 990 F.2d at 262-64 (addressing § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)'s mens rea
requirements); Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1333-45 (addressing §§ 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) &
1956(a) (2) (B) (i)'s mens rea requirements). As already noted, scholars and judges consider § 1956(a) (1) (B) and § 1956(a)(2)(B) indistinguishable. See, e.g., Carr, 25 F.3d
1194, 1204 ("[W]e find the distinction [between the two sections] so slight").
236. Compare Bencs, 28 F.3d at 561-63, McDougald, 990 F.2d at 262-64, and Beddow,
957 F.2d at 1333-45 with Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 and Carr, 25 F,3d 1194. For example, in
Beddow, the Sixth Circuit wrote "the government had the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knowingly conducted a financial transaction
with the proceeds of drug distribution." 957 F.2d at 1334 (emphasis added). In Carr, the
Third Circuit wrote "the requisite scienter element is established in the present case if
the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knew the funds he
was carrying represented the proceeds of any form of unlawful activity which is a felony under
state, federal, or foreign law." 25 F.3d at 1204 (emphasis added).
237. 990 F.2d 259.

§

288

FORDHAM INTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 21:253

States v. Beddow. 218 Several months later, the Fourth Circuit addressed section 1956 in United States v. Campbell.23 9 In interpreting section 1956's first mens rea requirement, the Sixth Circuit
used language markedly different from the language used by the
240
Fourth Circuit.
1. United States v. Beddow
In Beddow, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction of a defendant charged with money laundering in violation of section
1956.241 The defendant had appealed arguing that the government had failed to present evidence sufficient to establish section 1956's requisite mens rea requirements.2 4 2 The Sixth Cir238. 957 F.2d 1330.
239. 977 F.2d 854. The Sixth Circuit decided Beddow on February 28, 1992,
roughly seven months before the Fourth Circuit's decision in Campbell. See id. (argued
June 5, 1992, decided September 28, 1992).
240. Compare Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1333-45 with Campbell, 977 F.2d at 856-58. In
Campbell, the Fourth Circuit wrote "the Government need only show knowledge that the
funds represented 'the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity."' 977 F.2d at 858
(citation ommitted).
241. 957 F.2d at 1332. The Sixth Circuit also affirmed one count of conspiracy to
possess and distribute cocaine, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of income
tax evasion, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Id.
The specific § 1956 offenses on appeal were'18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1) (B) and
1956(a) (2) (B). Id. In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (B) provides for the sentencing of a person who, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to conceal the nature or ownership of the proceeds
or to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, conducts or
attempts to conduct such a transaction, which is later proven in fact to involve the
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (B).
In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (B) provides for the sentencing of a person
who, knowing that the monetary instrument or fund involved in a transportation represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation is designed in whole or in part to conceal the nature or ownership of the proceeds
or to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal Law, transports
or attempts to transport such instrument or funds from a place in the United States to
or through a place outside the United States, or from a place outside the United States
to or through a place in the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (B).
The Court treats both sections as one and the same, neither referring to one over
the other, nor distinguishing one from the other. See Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1334 ("We
conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict on the money laundering
charges." (emphasis added)); id. at 1335 ("Consequently, a rational jury could find that
[the defendant] violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1) (B) and 1956(a) (2) (B)." (emphasis
added)).
The Court also affirms one count of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957. Id. Section 1957 is outside the scope of this Comment.
242. Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1334. The defendant had been an alleged drug dealer.
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cuit disagreed.2 4
The Court first interpreted the mens rea requirements of
section 1956.244 The Court found that section 1956's mens rea
requirements required the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly conducted a financial transaction with the intent to conceal the nature of the proceeds involved in the financial transaction, the second mens rea
requirement, and knowingly conducted the financial transaction
with the proceeds of drug distribution,24 5the Court's interpretation of the first mens rea requirement.
The Court then found that the government had presented
24 6
sufficient evidence to establish the mens rea requirements.
First, the government had introduced tape recorded statements
made by the defendant stating that he had invested a large sum
of drug money in emeralds. 247 The Court found that through
the statements a rational jury could have found that the defendant knew the money used in the emerald deal was illegitimate
24 8
money, satisfying section 1956's first mens rea requirement.
Id. at 1333. He also had been an unsuccessful financial venturer, bankrupting such
businesses as a restaurant and a charter boat, both of which were allegedly funded his
drug proceeds. Id. Finally, he had been a gem smuggler. Id. His purchase and attempted sale of US$50,000 in uncut Brazilian emeralds had led to the money laundering charges. Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1333.
The emerald venture began in May of 1988 when the defendant and an accomplice
flew to Brazil with US$29,000 in travelers checks and US$18,000 in cash, all of which
belonged to the defendant but was purchased and carried by the accomplice. Id. In
Brazil, the defendant and his accomplice purchased 8000 carats of uncut emeralds. Id.
They returned to Chicago and solicited buyers for the emeralds. Beddow, 957 F.2d at
1333. Before they were able to find any buyers, however, federal agents seized the
emeralds. Id. The agents subsequently arrested both men. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1333.
[T]he government ha[s] the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that [the defendant] knowingly conducted a financial transaction with the proceeds of drug distribution, and that he did so with the intent to conceal the nature or source of those proceeds or with the intent to avoid a transaction reporting requirement.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court uses "financial transaction" universally, or in other
words, to satisfy section 1956(a) (2) (B)'s "transportation." Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1334.
246. Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1334-35.
247. Id. at 1334-35.
248. Id. at 1335. "A rational jury could find from these statements that [the defendant] knew that the funds involved in the emerald deal were the proceeds of unlawful
activity." Id. (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit's language here, interpreting the
first mens rea requirement, differs from the language used earlier where the Court
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Second, the Court held that a rational jury could also have
found that by arranging the transaction so that the accomplice
purchased the emeralds rather than the defendant himself, the
defendant was using the accomplice as a decoy to disguise his
ownership of the illegitimate money, satisfying section 1956's
49
second mens rea requirement.
The Sixth Circuit refers to Beddow in several subsequent
cases dealing with section 1956's mens rea requirement. 25 0 The
subsequent cases fail, however, to reflect the Sixth Circuit's adjusted interpretation of section 1956's first mens rea requirement. 25 1 In the subsequent cases, the decisions rely on the
Court's initial interpretation that the first mens rea requirement
required proof that the accused knew the proceeds involved in
the alleged money laundering transaction were derived from a
25 2
specific unlawful activity.
2. United States v. Campbell
Several months after the Sixth Circuit's decision in Beddow,
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Campbell received its own
opportunity to interpret section 1956's first mens rea requirement. 25 3 There, the Fourth Circuit held, in contrast to the Sixth
Circuit, that the first mens rea requirement required proof that
the defendant knowingly conducted a financial transaction with
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, rather than the
proceeds of a specific unlawful activity, such as drug trafficking. 25 ' The case dealt with the prosecution of Ellen Campbell
interpreted the first mens rea requirement as requiring proof that the defendant knew
the money was "proceeds of drug distribution." Id. The Court was correcting its earlier
mistake. Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1335.
249. Id. at 1335.
250. See, e.g., Samour, 9 F.3d at 535 (1993) (citing to Beddow); Smith, 39 F.3d at 122
(1994) (citing to Beddow).
251. See, e.g., Samour, 9 F.3d at 535 (using Beddow's initial interpretation of the first
mens rea requirement); Smith, 39 F.3d at 122 (using Beddow's initial interpretation of
the first mens rea requirement).
252. Samour, 9 F.3d at 535; Smith, 39 F.3d at 122. In Samour, the Court states,
"[u] nder [section 1956], the United States has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 'knowingly conducted a financial transaction with the
proceeds of drug distribution." 9 F.3d at 535 (citing Beddow). In Smith, the Court
states, "[i]n order to convict the defendant of money laundering, the prosecution must
prove that the defendant ... knew that the money was from a specified unlawful activity." 39 F.3d at 122 (citing Beddow).
253. 977 F.2d 854.
254. Id. at 858. "As the text of the statute indicates, the Government need only
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("Campbell"), a North Carolina real estate agent.2 55 The government had accused her of money laundering in violation of
section 1956.256 Specifically, the government accused her of assisting a drug dealer purchase a house, knowing that the money
used in the purchase represented criminally derived proceeds,
and knowing that the drug dealer was attempting to conceal the
nature of the money.2 5 7 The issue on appeal was whether the
government had provided evidence sufficient to demonstrate
25 8
that Campbell had the two requisite mens rea requirements.
Like the Sixth Circuit in Beddow, the Court first interpreted
section 1956's mens rea requirement. 2 59 The Court found the
lower court's interpretation of both mens rea requirements incorrect. 260 With respect to the first mens rea requirement, the
Court held that the requirement, which the lower court had interpreted to require knowledge of a specific unlawful activity, required only knowledge of some form of unlawful activity.2 6 1 The
show knowledge that the funds represented 'the proceeds of some form of unlawful
activity."' Id. (citation ommitted).
255. Id. at 855. In the summer of 1989, a drug dealer approached Campbell and
proffered the need to purchase a house. Campbell, 977 F.2d at 855-56. Within a week,
Campbell assisted the drug dealer find a house selling for US$182,500. Id. The drug
dealer, who could not obtain a mortgage for the full amount, agreed with the owners of
the house and Campbell to pay US$60,000 in cash and the balance by mortgage. Id.
Implicit in the agreement was the understanding that the sales price of the house would
only reflect the reduced price of US$122,500, with the US$60,000 considered "under
the table" and unreflected. Campbell, 977 F.2d at 855-56.
At the closing, the drug dealer, who during the entire relationship with Campbell
hid his true occupation but nevertheless drove in either a red or gold Porsche and
carried large amounts of cash (US$20,000 in one instance), appeared at Campbell's
office with the US$60,000 in a brown paper grocery bag. Id. The money was counted,
and a contract was executed reflecting only the US$122,500 sales price. Id. Campbell
was arrested shortly thereafter. Id.
256. Campbell, 977 F.2d at 856. Specifically, the government charged her with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Id.
The last charge was for filing a false statement, which in the case was a statement on the
closing form. Id.
257. Id. at 856.
258. Campbell, 977 F.2d at 856. "The central issue in contention is whether there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Campbell possessed the knowledge that:
(1) [the drug dealer's] funds were the proceeds of illegal activity, and (2) the transaction was designed to disguise the nature of those proceeds." Id. The lower court had
found the evidence insufficient to convict Campbell. Id.
259. Id.
260. Campbell, 977 F.2d at 57.
261. Id. at 57 n.3. "[T]he district court's statement that the Government must
show Campbell possessed 'knowledge of the drug dealer's activities,' is ... incorrect.
The statute requires only a showing that the defendant had knowledge that 'the prop-
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Court subsequently found that the government had provided evidence sufficient to convict Campbell, and reversed the lower
court's decision. 6 2
B. United States v. McDougald
The Sixth Circuit revisited section 1956 and its mens rea requirements in United States v. McDougald.2 6 3 Notwithstanding a
dissent, the Court reversed the conviction of defendant, Bobby
McDougald, a former U.S. Green Beret and retired army sergeant, for money laundering in violation of section 1956.264 Interpreting the first mens rea requirement as requiring specific
knowledge of drug trafficking, the Court held that the government's evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. 6 5
erty involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of illegal
activity.'" Id. (citation ommitted). With respect to the second mens rea requirement,
the Court held that the requirement, which the lower court had interpreted as requiring proof that the defendant herself had a purpose to conceal, only required proof that
the defendant knew that the transaction was designed by the drug dealer, rather than
herself, to conceal the illegal proceeds. Id. at 57. The Court stated, "[t]he distinction is
critical." Id.
262. Id. at 858-59. The government had introduced evidence demonstrating that
Campbell had stated at least on one prior occasion that she knew or at least contemplated that the money involved in the transaction was drug money. Campbell, 977 F.2d
at 859. The government had also introduced evidence demonstrating that Campbell
was fully aware of the drug dealer's lifestyle, which included driving a Porsche, using a
cellular phone, and carrying large amounts of cash. Id. Coupled with the unusual nature of the closing, the Court found the evidence "pointing to Campbell's knowledge of
[the drug dealer's] illegal activities." Id. at 858.
[W]e find that a reasonable jury could have found that Campbell was willfully
blind to the fact that [she was dealing with] a drug dealer and the fact that the
purchase of the [house] was intended, at least in part, to conceal the proceeds
of [the drug dealer's] drug selling operation. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of acquittal on the money laundering charge.
Id. at 859. See generally Willful Blindness Prosecutionsare Dealt Setback, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 1, 1991 (discussing Campbell decision); U.S. Wins major Court
Victory on Willful Blindness, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 1, 1992 (dis-

cussing Campbell decision).
263. 990 F.2d 259. The Court also addressed the last element of section 1956,
requiring proof that the proceeds be in fact the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, See 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
264. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 260.
265. Id.. Although decided sixth months after Campbell, McDougald fails to cite
Campbell, effectively ignoring Campbell's relatively similar facts, analysis, and holding.
Compare Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, with McDougald, 990 F.2d 259.
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1. Facts
Bobby McDougald ("McDougald") lived in Columbus,
Ohio, next door to Ronald and Darlene Watts. 2 6 6 McDougald
considered the Watts' close friends, referring to himself on occasion as their Uncle Bobby.2 67 Ronald Watts ("Watts") managed a
promotion company called Wattsline Entertainment.2 68 Allegedly unknown to McDougald, Watts was also the head of a Cali269
fornia drug ring.
In June of 1990, Watts suggested McDougald drive his Wattsline Entertainment van to California and pick up a friend
named Eddie McFadden ("McFadden").o With the meeting to
take place at a restaurant, McDougald agreed and drove to California.2 71 The meeting never took place, however, and McDougald telephoned Watts from California for further instructions. 272 Another meeting was soon arranged and McDougald
found McFadden and drove him back to Ohio.2 7 3 Like Watts,
McFadden was a major drug dealer.27 4 Allegedly, McDougald
was unaware of this, as he was unaware that Watts was also involved in drugs.2 75
On June 4, Watts suggested McDougald purchase a car for
276 McDougald agreed and along with Watts and an
McFadden.
266. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 260.
267. Id. The fact that McDougald was a close friend to the Watts's is significant
considering that in Campbell the Fourth Circuit held that evidence regarding a person's
knowledge of another person's lifestyle may be used to infer actual knowledge of a
possible link to unlawful activity. See Campbell, 977 F.2d at 859 ("[The defendant's]
lifestyle was sufficient to negate the credibility of Campbell's assertion that she believed
[the defendant] to be a legitimate businessman.").
268. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 260.
269. Id.; see U.S. Willful Blindness Weapon Damaged, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT IN-

TERNATIONAL, July 1, 1993 (referring to the facts of McDougald as "the stuff of soap
operas.").
270. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 260.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. The suspicious nature of McDougald's meeting with McFadden is similar
to the "fraudulent nature of the transaction in which Campbell was asked to participate." Campbell, 977 F.2d at 859.
274. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 260.
275. Id. The Government did, however, present evidence that McDougald knew
Watts smoked marijuana. Id. ("Watts had once lit a marijuana cigarette in McDougald's
car. McDougald immediately pulled over and insisted that Watts put the cigarette out
and never have drugs in his presence again.").
276. Id.
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accomplice, McDougald traveled to a local Chevrolet dealership. 277 There, after selecting a 1990 Beretta, McDougald informed the dealer that the purchase would be in cash,
US$10,000 in cash. 27" The cash had originally belonged to McFadden.279 The car was purchased 280 and the three men returned to the Watts' house. 281' Two days later, McDougald drove
McFadden back to California in the new Beretta.2 82 He left the
car with McFadden and flew back to Ohio.2 88
On January 18, 1991, Ohio police searched the Watts' home
and found a set of keys to a 1990 Beretta and a registration tag in
McDougald's name.28 4 Shortly thereafter, the police questioned
McDougald, inquiring about the Beretta.2 8 5 McDougald told
them that he indeed had at one time owned a Beretta but it had
been demolished in an accident in October of 1990.286 He also
told them that he could not remember whether he had
28 7
purchased the car with cash or credit.
2. The District Court and Sixth Circuit Holdings
The government charged McDougald with money laundering in violation of section 1956.288 Specifically, the government
accused him of knowingly using US$10,000 in drug proceeds to
277. Id.
278. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 260. According to the Court, the accomplice, a friend
of Watts's, "passed the cash to McDougald behind the table." Id.; see Campbell, 977 F.2d
at 858 ("[T]he fraudulent nature of the transaction itself provides a sufficient basis
from which a jury could infer [a defendant's] knowledge.").
279. Id. McFadden had given the cash to the accomplice at Watts' house. Id.
280. Id. The selling price for the car was $9999 plus $3.50 for temporary tags. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. Leaving the car with McFadden had its own complications. In the fall of
1990, McDougald began receiving by mail California parking tickets connected to the
Beretta. Id. at 261. McDougald complained to Watts that he could not afford to pay
the tickets. Id. Watts agreed to pay the tickets, "eventually." Id.
284. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 261. The decision fails to explain what the police
were doing at Watts's residence. See id. But see U.S. Willful Blindness Weapon Damaged,
supra note 269 (reporting that Watts "offered up McDougald to the government following his own arrest for conspiracy to distribute cocaine.").
285. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 261.
286. Id. The officers asked McDougald what cars he owned. He answered that he
owned a 1980 Oldsmobile, a 1975 Buick, and a 1978 Eldorado. McDougald, 990 F.2d at
261. The officers asked if he owned any other cars. Id. He finally answered that at one
time he indeed had owned a 1990 Beretta. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 259-60.
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purchase a car for a drug dealer, and then registering the car in
his own name.289 At trial, McDougald denied the accusation.29 °
He testified that he had borrowed Watts' van to travel to California, not to meet McFadden, but to visit friends and family. 29 1 He
also testified that he had never met McFadden in Ohio, but
rather had returned alone to Ohio.2 9 2 As for the car purchase,
he denied it was for McFadden .293 He testified that the car was
for his son and that it was purchased with his own money.2 9 4
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio295rejected his story and found him guilty of money laundering.
The Sixth Circuit reversed. 296 The Court first found McDougald's version of the events entirely fabricated. 29 7 The Court

then found, nevertheless, that the Government had failed to
prove section 1956's requisite mens rea requirements. 298 In doing so, the Court interpreted section 1956's first mens rea requirement as requiring proof of actual knowledge, specifically,
that a defendant knew the money involved in a transaction was
money derived from drug trafficking, rather than from some
299
form of unlawful activity.
289. Id. at 260. The Court's language implies that McDougald was charged specifically with section 1956(a) (1) (B) (i). Id. The opinion otherwise fails to state the exact
subsection of 1956 at issue. Id.
290. Id. at 261.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 261. His son had been stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Id. McDougald testified that his son had called him from the base and told him that the Beretta
had been involved in an accident. Id. His son was then sent to the Middle East as part
of Desert Shield and was unavailable for trial. Id.
295. Id. at 260. The district court sentenced McDougald to eight years. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 261. See also id. at 265 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("As the court correctly
states, a rational jury could certainly conclude 'that this entire story was fabricated.' ").
298. Id. at 261. The Court also found that the record contained insufficient evidence to prove that the money was in fact drug proceeds, the last element of section
1956. Id.
299. Id. "To uphold this verdict we must find that the record contains sufficient
evidence to convince a reasonable juror beyond a reasonable doubt that Bobby McDougald knowingly laundered drug money when he purchases the Beretta for Eddie McFadden." Id. at 261.
The Court interprets the first mens rea requirement this way in over ten instances.
See id. at 260 ("The case is based on weak.., evidence that the defendant knew it was
drug money."); id. at 261 ("To uphold this verdict we must find that the record contains
sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable juror beyond a reasonable doubt that
Bobby McDougald knowingly laundered drug money."); id. at 262 ("Even if there were
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The dissent took notice of the majority's language and the
language's consequential burden.3 0 ' The dissent found that
with the majority's holding, a defendant would be able to escape
liability by merely alleging that the defendant did not know the
money involved in the transaction represented the proceeds of
drug trafficking. 0 In the dissent's view, the government had
30 2
sufficiently established McDougald's guilt.
C. Post McDougald
While the Sixth Circuit continued to interpret section
1956's first mens rea requirement as requiring proof that the
accused knew the money involved in a transaction represented
the proceeds of a specific unlawful activity, the other circuits
continued to interpret section 1956's first mens rea requirement
as requiring proof that the accused knew the money involved in
the transaction represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.1° 3 Illustrative is United States v. Car, 30 4 where the
Third Circuit held that section 1956's legislative intent mansufficient evidence that the $10,000 was drug money, there is insufficient evidence that
McDougald knew its source."); id. ("The proof relied upon by the government that
McDougald knew the $10,000 was drug money."); id. at 263 ("There is no evidence that
McDougald knew Watts and McFadden were in the drug business."); id. ("[McDougald's] purchase of a car for McFadden does not tend to establish that he knew the
$10,000 was drug money."); id. at 264 ("the government's own ... witnesses tends to
undermine an inference that defendant knew he was laundering drug money.").
300. Id. at 265 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
301. Id. The dissent stated,
The quality of proof in this case shows no indication of differing significantly
from any other money laundering case. A drug dealer in McFadden's position, under the majority's rationale, would appear to be able to use a pawn like
McDougald with impunity so long as no witness could be found to testify that
McDougald was unmistakenly told, in the presence of others, 'we are drug
dealers and I am giving you drug money.' The law does no require so extensive a burden.
Id.
302. Id. "The evidence against McDougald is not that he went bowling or to
church with Watts; or that they have friends and acquaintances in common. Instead,
the evidence shows that McDougald took three cross-country trips at the behest of Watts
and McFadden, for no apparent legitimate purpose; that McDougald lied repeatedly
about these transactions; and that McDougald knew that he was engaged in concealing
McFadden's connection with the car." Id. For a further analysis on McDougald, see U.S.
Willful Blindness Weapon Damaged, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT INTERNATIONAL, July 1,
1993.
303. Compare McDougald, 990 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), with Cart, 25 F.3d 1194 (3rd
Cir.).
304. 25 F.3d 1194 (1994).
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dated no other interpretation."0 5 In 1994, the Sixth Circuit finally relented, holding in United States v. Bencs3 ° 6 that section
1956's first mens rea requirement required proof that the accused knew the money involved in the transaction represented
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, rather than a
specific unlawful activity."7 In doing so, however, the Sixth Circuit did not overrule its language in McDougald.3 °8 Rather, the
Sixth Circuit distinguished McDougaldwith further language stating that McDougald applied wherever evidence of the accused
knowledge was as consistent with innocence as with guilt.3" 9
1. United States v. Carr
The Third Circuit interpreted section 1956's mens rea requirements in United States v. Car. 31 ° There, like in Beddow,
Campbell, and McDougald, the Court's central issue was whether
the evidence regarding the mens rea requirements was sufficient
to convict the defendant."' l The Court, interpreting the mens
rea requirements muck like the Fourth Circuit in Campbell,
found the evidence sufficient and upheld the conviction. 1 2
The defendant in Carr, Robert Carr Jr., was accused of being involved in a money laundering network spanning the
boundaries of Colombia and Pennsylvania. 3 Carr's role in the
network was to carry drug proceeds from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Cali, Colombia. 1 4 On one of these trips, United
States Customs agents arrested Carr, finding US$186,000 on his
3 15
person.
On appeal from conviction, Carr argued that the govern305. See id. at 1204 (citing S.Rep. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1986)).
306. 28 F.3d 555 (1994).
307. See Bencs, 28 F.3d at 562 n.8 (implicitly holding that section 1956's first mens
rea requirement required general knowledge, rather than a specific knowledge).
308. See id. (distinguishing rather than overruling McDougald).
309. See Bencs, 28 F.3d at 562 n.8 (holding that "[the] government did not prove
that defendant knowingly laundered a third person's drug proceeds.., where evidence
of defendant's knowledge of source of money was as consistent with innocence as with
guilt... implying in that kind of case that government must trace the allegedly laundered money to specific unlawful activity.").
310. 25 F.3d 1194 (1994).
311. Id. at 1198.
312. Id.
313. Carr, 25 F.3d at 1198-1200.
314. Id. at 1198.
315. Id.
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ment failed to prove he had the requisite mens rea to commit
the act of money laundering. 1 6 The Third Circuit, after first
stating section 1956's express language, interpreted the section's
two mens rea requirements individually.3 17 With respect to the
first mens rea requirement, the Court interpreted the requirement to mean that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the funds he had been
carrying represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity."' s In arriving at its interpretation, the Court referred to a
Senate report relating to section 1956's mens rea requirements,
which expressly provided for the interpretation.3 1 9 The Court
then found the government's evidence sufficient to satisfy the
3 20
section's first mens rea requirement.
2. United States v. Bencs
In United States v. Bencs,32 t the Sixth Circuit again addressed
section 1956's first mens rea requirement. 32 2 The Court used
language identical to language found in Beddow and reaffirmed
in McDougald.32 3 In Bencs, however, the Court distinguished the
316. Id. at 1203.
317. Carr, 25 F.3d at 1204.
318. Id. "We hold that the requisite scienter element is established in the present
case if the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Carr knew the funds he was
carrying represented the proceeds of any form of unlawful activity which is a felony
under state, federal, or foreign law." Id.
319. Id.; S.Rep. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1986):
[T]he defendant need not know exactly what crime generated the funds involved in a transaction, only that the funds are the proceeds of some kind of
crime that is a felony under Federal or State law. This will eviscerate the defense that a defendant knew the funds came from a crime, but thought the
crime involved was a crime not on the list of 'specified' crimes in section
(c) (7).
Id.
320. Carr, 25 F.3d at 1205. The Court found sufficient the evidence of recorded
phone conversation between Carr and his co-conspirators, Carr's frequent travels with
the leader of the money laundering network, and finally Carr's false statements to airport officials. Id.
321. 28 F.3d 555.
322. Id.
323. See id. at 561 ("[T] hat the transactions involved the proceeds of drug sales, as
[the defendant] knew."); McDougald, 990 F.2d at 261 ("To uphold this verdict we must
find that the records contains sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable juror beyond
a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knowingly laundered drug money."); Beddow,
957 F.2d at 1334 ("[T]he government must prove ... that [the defendant] knowingly
conducted a financial transaction with the proceeds of rug distribution.").
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holding in McDougald and affirmed the conviction of a defendant for money laundering in violation of section 1956.324
Bencs had been charged with five instances of laundering
drug proceeds as payroll.3 25 He was convicted on all counts and
sentenced to sixty-five months imprisonment.3 2 6 In affirming
the conviction, the Sixth Circuit first drew out the elements of
section 1956.327 The Court implicitly stated that Bencs had to
have entered a transaction; that Bencs knew the transaction was
designed to disguise the nature of the money; and finally, that
Bencs knew the money involved in the transaction were the proceeds of drug sales. 3 28 The Court then found the government's
evidence sufficient as a matter of law to satisfy each of the ele329
ments.
324. Id. at 562.
325. Id. Defendant Ronald Bencs was the president and sole shareholder of Diversified Financial Enterprises, a company involved in striping parking lots, selling jewelry,
selling art work, selling Christmas trees, and renovating houses. Bencs, 28 F.3d at 55557. In 1988, IRS criminal investigators, in relation to a derivative investigation, seized
Bencs' financial records. Id. After reviewing the records, the investigators noted that
Bencs' reported income failed to justify his net worth. Id. The investigators questioned
Bencs. Id. Bencs claimed that his income was legitimate and denied any assumptions
of illegality. Id.
The investigators discovered, however, that Bencs and his company were embroiled in a complicated drug scheme. Id. at 555-57. From 1972 to 1989, Bencs bought
and sold marijuana. Id. In 1978 Bencs formed Diversified to conceal the proceeds of
the drug operations. Id. At trial, IRS agents demonstrated that a total of US$376,000 in
cash and US$42,000 in checks were deposited to Diversified. Id. A total of US$318,000
was disbursed, however, in payroll checks to Bencs. Id.
Aside from the money laundering charges, Bencs was also charged with conspiring
to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, income tax evasion in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and with avoiding cash transaction reporting requirements in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5322. Id. at 558.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 561. The specific 1956 subsection at issue was subsection (a) (1) (B) (i).
Id.
328. Id. The Court stated,
The charges set forth the elements of a § 1956(a) (1) (B) (i) offense in alleging
that [Bencs' acccountant] issued checks drawn against Diversified's account to
Bencs and that Bencs negotiated the checks; that the transactions involved the
proceeds of drug sales, as Bencs knew; and finally, that Bencs acted knowing
that the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the nature and source
of the proceeds.
Id.
329. Id. at 562. "On the records presented, a rationaljuror could have found each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm Bencs' laundering convictions." Id.
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In a footnote, the Court distinguished McDougald.33 0 The
Court stated that in McDougald the defendant had been charged
with laundering another person's drug proceeds, and that the
government had failed to demonstrate that the defendant knew
the source of the allegedly laundered money.3 31 The Court
stated that in Bencs, Bencs was charged with laundering the proceeds of his own drug money.3 3 2 The Court repeated its argument parenthetically, that in McDougald, the government had
failed to prove that the defendant knowingly laundered a third
person's drug proceeds.3 3 3 The Court also stated, parenthetically, that in a case where the government introduced no evidence of the third person's source of income and where evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the source of money was
as consistent with innocence as with guilt, the government had
the burden of tracing the allegedly laundered money to a spe3 34
cific unlawful activity.
III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT SHOULD OVERRULE MCDOUGALD
BECAUSE IT IS FUNDAMENTALLY INCORRECT
A court may overrule a prior decision upon three traditional
grounds. 3 5 The grounds are that the decision's holding is unworkable, the decision's underlying rationale is outdated, or the
decision is subject to an intervening development in the law. 33 6
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has implicitly recognized several other grounds upon which a court may overrule a
prior decision. 33' They include changed conditions, conflicting
330. See id. at 562 n.8.
331. Id. "In McDougald, the defendant was charged with laundering another person's drug proceeds, and the government failed to demonstrate that the defendant
knew the source of the allegedly laundered money. Id.
332. Id. "In this case, Bencs is charged with laundering the proceeds of his own
drug activity." Id.
333. Id. In McDougald, the "government did not prove that the defendant knowingly laundered a third person's drug proceeds." Id.
334. Id. "[W]here government introduced no evidence of the third person's
source of income and where evidence of defendant's knowedge of source of money was
as consistent with innocence as with guilt . . . government must trace the allegedly
laundered money to specific unlawful activity." Id.
335. See generally Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The Art of Overruling,1963
Sup. CT. REV. 211, 220-25 (1963) (discussing process of overruling U.S. case law).
336. See id. (discussing three grounds of overruling).
337. See Carolyn D. Richmond, The Rehnquist Court: What is in Storefor Constitutional
Law Precedent?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 511, 518 (1994) (discussing criteria for overruling
U.S. Supreme Court precedent).
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precedents, and fundamentally incorrect decisions."'
Here, the Sixth Circuit should overrule McDougald because
it is a fundamentally incorrect decision. The McDougald decision
is in direct conflict with the plain meaning of section 1956, is in
direct conflict with the legislative history of section 1956, and is
in conflict with national efforts against money laundering. Overruling McDougald will also prevent misapplication of section
1956 in future cases, such as the one that will most likely be born
out of the Salinas-Citibank Affair.
A. McDougald is in Direct Conflict with the Plain Meaning of
Section 1956
The first rule of statutory interpretation is for a court to give
effect to the plain meaning of a statute's language.3" 9 If the statute's language is unambiguous, the court must regard the language as conclusive.3 4 ° A court should disregard the plain meaning of a statute only if such an interpretation would lead to absurd results. 4 1
Section 1956's express language prohibits a person from internationally transporting income that the person knows represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, and that
the person knows is designed to disguise the nature of the pro338. Id.; see also Schott Optical Glass v. United States, 750 F.2d 62, 64 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (holding that court may overrule prior decision that was clearly erroneous); Johns
v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding that obvious error in prior decision need not be perpetuated by strict adherence to decision); Helms Bakeries v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that court may overrule prior decision
that was erroneous); Stewart v. United States, 267 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1959) (holding
that court may overrule prior decision that cannot be sustained on sound ground).
339. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) ("In determining the
scope of a statue .... look first to its language."). See generally David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation,67 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 921 (1992) (discussing rules
of statutory interpretation).
340. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 177 ("If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the
absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."); Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court ...must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.").
341. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTrr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 2.2(c), at 106 (1986)("[S] tatutes, even plain statutes, should not receive a construction leading to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.").
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ceeds.34 2 According to the express language, the statute's first
mens rea requirement requires the prosecution to prove that the
accused knew the proceeds involved in the transportation were
derived from some form of unlawful activity. 4 A 1956 subsection
emphasizes the first mens rea's express language, stating that
some form of unlawful activity means some form, not a specific form,
34 4
of felonious conduct.
In McDougald, the Sixth Circuit disregards section 1956's express language. 45 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit interprets section 1956's first mens rea requirement as requiring the prosecution to prove that defendant, McDougald, knew the proceeds involved in the transportation were derived from drug trafficking,
a specific form of unlawful activity, rather than some form of
unlawful activity, as expressly provided by the statute. 346 The
Sixth Circuit, in essence, disregards the first rule of statutory interpretation.
A proper reading of section 1956's first mens rea requirement would have required the prosection merely to prove that
McDougald knew the proceeds involved in the car purchase
were derived from some form of unlawful activity. Moreover, in
conjunction with section 1956's subsection emphasizing that
some form of unlawful activity means some form, rather than a spe342. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text (discussing language of section
1956).
343. See supra notes 188-201 and accompanying text (discussing section 1956's first
mens rea requirement).
344. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing section 1956(c) (1)).
Section 1956(c) (1) provides that,
the term "knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity" means that the person
knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from
some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a
felony under State, Federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such
activity is specified in paragraph (7) [listing specified crimes that fall within the
statute].
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (1).
345. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's interpretation of section 1956 in McDougald).
To uphold this verdict we must find that the record contains sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable juror beyond a reasonable doubt that Bobby
McDougald knowingly laundered drug money when he purchases the Beretta
for Eddie McFadden.
McDougald, 990 F.2d at 261.
346. Id.
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cific form, of felonious conduct, a proper reading would have satisfied the prosecution's case. The facts of McDougald show ample evidence that defendant, McDougald, knew the proceeds involved in the car purchase were derived from some form of
felonious conduct.3 4 7 The Sixth Circuits failure to follow section
1956's express language was fatal to the prosecution's case.
B. McDougald is in Direct Conflict with the Legislative Intent of
Section 1956
A second rule of statutory interpretation is for a court to
review the legislative intent of the statute.3 4 8 Where the legislative intent is discernable, a court must give effect to that intent.

349

Section 1956's legislative history is significant.3 51 In regards
to section 1956's first mens rea requirement, the legislative history provides that the requirement requires the prosecution to
prove that the accused knew the proceeds were derived from
some form of unlawful activity. 51 Moreover, the legislative history
provides that the first mens rea requirement's language was intentional, particularly to prevent the use of the defense of ignorance in section 1956 prosecutions.352 Ultimately, the legislative
history shows that the prosecution need only prove that the ac347. See supra notes 266-83 and accompanying text (discussing facts of McDougald).
For example, McDougald had participated in a suspicious meeting and pickup of McFadden, and a suspicious car purchase with US$10,000 cash for McFadden. McDougald
also lied about the cars whereabouts to police and to the court. Compare these facts to
Carr, 25 F.3d at 1198-1200, where the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction upon facts
that the defendant had traveled with the leader of the money laundering network and
that the defendant lied to law enforcement officials. See supra note 320 (discussing
holding of Carr). Also compare the facts of McDougald with the facts of Campbell, where
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction upon the facts that the defendant had at
least contemplated the possibility that the money was derived from some illegal activity,
and that the defendant participated in a rather unusual house closing. See supra note
262 (discussing holding of Campbell).
348. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238-39
(1989) (reviewing legislative intent to interpret statute).
349. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) ("[W]e have no
power to change deliberate choices of legislative policy that Congress has made ....
Where congressional intent is discernible ... we must give effect to that intent.").
350. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text (reviewing legislative history of
statute).
351. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text (discussing legislative intent of
section 1956's first mens rea requirement).
352. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing use of defense of ignorance).
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cused 53
knew the proceeds were derived from some kind of
3iie
crime.~~
In McDougald, the Sixth Circuit disregards section 1956's
legislative history. 4 The Sixth Circuit, in fact, fails to review section 1956's legislative history. In contrast, the Third Circuit in
Carr5 5 directly reviewed section 1956's legislative history and discovered, properly, the legislatively mandated interpretation of
section 1956's first mens rea requirement. 56 The Sixth Circuit,
by failing to review the legislative history of section 1956 came to
an improper interpretation of the section's first mens rea requirement.
A proper reading of section 1956's first mens rea requirement through the use of the section's legislative history would
have brought the Sixth Circuit to the conclusion that the defendant, McDougald, need not have known the exact crime that
generated the proceeds used in the car purchase, only that the
proceeds were derived from some kind of crime. With the facts
of the case showing ample evidence that McDougald knew Watts
and McFadden were questionable characters, a proper interpretation would have won the case for the prosecution.3 5 7
C. McDougald is in Direct Conflict with National Efforts Against
Money Laundering
National efforts against money laundering have recently
taken on an aggressive posture.35 8 While before 1990 some nations focused their efforts against money laundering only in connection with drug trafficking, today, most nations focus their efforts against money laundering in connection with all major
353. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing ultimate proof required).
354. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth Circuit's interpretation of section 1956 in McDougald).
355. 25 F.3d 1194.
356. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit's use of
Senate Report No. 433 in coming to conclusion that section 1956's first mens rea requirement requires that prosecution merely prove accused knew that proceeds were
derived from some form of unlawful activity rather than specific form of activity).
357. See surpra note 347 (discussing facts of McDougald, which should have led
Sixth Circuit to affirm conviction of defendant McDougald).
358. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing national efforts against
money laundering).
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criminal offenses.35 9 Correlatively, today, most nations promulgate their mens rea requirements to require proof that the accused knew the proceeds involved in an alleged money laundering transaction were derived from some form of unlawful activ3 60
ity, rather than a specific form of unlawful activity.
In McDougald, the Sixth Circuit's decision impinges upon
the international community's efforts against money laundering.
The Sixth Circuit, by interpreting section 1956's first mens rea
requirement as requiring proof that the accused knew the proceeds were derived from a specific form of unlawful activity, contradicts the international community's efforts. The Sixth Circuit's decision reverses the international trend in broadening
money laundering statutes to encompass all crimes, rather than
the crime of drug trafficking alone. 6
A proper reading of Section 1956 would have merely required proof that the accused knew the proceeds were derived
from some form of unlawful activity. Such an interpretation
would have been consistent with Section 1956's expansive scope.
Such an interpretation would also have been consistent with the
international community's efforts against money laundering.
D. OverrulingMcDougald Will Prevent Misapplication of Section
1956 in Future Cases
The Sixth Circuit should overrule McDougald to prevent misapplication or confusion in future section 1956 cases. For example, subsequent to the Sixth Circuit's decision in McDougald, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit"), in United States v. Wynn, 362 was focdt
forced to
distinguish McDougald.3 63 The defendant in Wynn impliedly argued that the McDougald mens rea requirement was applicable
to his case.3 64 The D.C. Circuit recited the McDougald Court's
359. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing regional efforts against
money laundering).
360. See supra notes 94, 106, & 118 and accompanying text (discussing Italy's, Germany's, and Mexico's money laundering statutes, requiring only knowledge of general
nature).
361. See supra notes 53-88 and accompanying text (discussing trend broadening
anti-money laundering statutes and, in particullar, France's move to broaden its antimoney laundering statute).
362. 61 F.3d 921, 925 (1995).
363. Id.
364. Id.

306

FORDHAMIWERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol.21:253

interpretation of the first mens rea requirement and then
demonstrated, with a corrected interpretation, that the defendant's reliance on McDougald was misplaced.3 6 1 Overruling McDougald would have prevented the defendant's misapplication.
Also illustrative of the need to overrule McDougald to prevent misapplication of Section 1956 in future cases is Section
1956's role in the impending Salinas-Citibank Affair. There, Section 1956's interpretation will most likely be a central issue.
Therefore, whether McDougald's interpretation is applicable will
also be a central issue.
1. Citibank-Salinas Affair with McDougald
If McDougald is not overruled, the court hearing the SalinasCitibank Affair may rely on McDougald'sinterpretation of Section
1956's first mens rea requirement. Consequently, the court may
require the prosection to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Citibank knew the proceeds involved in the transportation of
Raul's money were derived from drug trafficking, or any other
specific offense. Such a requirement would require an oppressive amount of proof. 6 6
The facts of the Salinas-Citibank Affair demonstrate that
Raul had indeed a questionable reputation, but do not demonstrate specifically a reputation of drug trafficking.3 67 Meanwhile,
Citibank's Amy Elliot denies any knowledge of any of Raul's
questionable activities.3 68 With the burden upon the prosecu365. Id.
The cases on which Wynn relies for his insufficiency of the evidence claim are
clearly distinguishable. In [McDougald], the defendant was asked by a friend
to take [US]$10,000 in cash and use it to purchase a car for a third person
whom the defendant had met only once and who turned out to be a drug
dealer. In reversing McDougald's money laundering conviction, the Sixth Circuit held that, not only was there insufficient evidence that the [US]$10,000
constituted drug proceeds, there was insufficient evidence that McDougald knew
its source.... In contrast to the facts of those cases, Wynn's ongoing relationship with Edmond and Lewis and his efforts to disguise their identity as customers suggests knowledge both of illegal activities and of a design to conceal.
Wynn, 61 F.3d at 925 (citations omitted).
366. See supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text (discussing McDougald dissenting opinion noting consequential burden of requiring specific proof of knowledge).
367. See supra note 203 (discussing Raul's well known reputation as "scoundrel")
and note 212 (discussing conflicting reports of Raul's connection with Mexican drug
cartel).
368. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing Elliot's deposition testimony denying knowledge of Raul's reputation).
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tion to prove that Amy Elliot knew specifically that Raul's money
was from drug trafficking, the prosecution would certainly lose
its case.
2. Citibank-Salinas Affair without McDougald
If McDougald is properly overruled, the court hearing the
Salinas-Citibank Affair will not rely on McDougald's interpretation of Section 1956's first mens rea requirement. Consequently, the court will properly require the prosection to merely
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Citibank knew the proceeds involved in the transportation of Raul's money were derived from some unlawful activity. Such a requirement would
not carry a heavy burden upon the prosecution.
The facts of the Salinas-Citibank Affair demonstrate that
Raul's questionable reputation was highlighted in a number of
newspapers and magazines.3 6 9 Citibank's Amy Elliot, a highly
ranked banking executive with a specialization in Mexican clients, will not be able to argue faithfully that she did not read any
of these newspapers or magazines.37 0 With the burden on the
prosecution to prove that Amy Elliot knew that Raul's money was
from an unlawful activity, the prosecution will certainly win their
case.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit should overrule McDougald because it is
fundamentally incorrect. McDougald is in direct conflict with the
plain meaning of Section 1956 and with the statute's legislative
intent. McDougald is also in direct conflict with national efforts
against money laundering. Finally, overruling McDougald will
prevent misapplication and confusion in future Section 1956
cases, particularly the one that will be born out of the SalinasCitibank Affair.

369. See supra note 203 (discussing Wall Street Journal's report of Raul's reputation) and note 213 (discussing CBS television broadcast report of Raul's reputation).
370. See supra note 227 (discussing industry experts' skepticism toward Elliot's ignorance) and note 230 and accompanying text (discussing industry experts' argument
that Elliot must have known of Raul's questionable reputation).

